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PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS (PBL) 
FOR THE FA-18/S-3/P-3/C-2 
 AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) AT HONEYWELL; 





The purpose of this MBA project is to evaluate and assess the metrics, incentives 
and other terms and conditions of the Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract 
between Naval Aviation Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) and Honeywell in support of 
FA-18/S-3/P-3/C-2 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to determine if the contractual terms 
and conditions established are effective in facilitating and encouraging the full potential 
of PBL savings and improved performance.  PBL is an acquisition reform initiative 
intended to improve weapon system logistics with the goals of:  1) compressing the 
supply chain, 2) eliminating non-value added steps, 3) reducing total ownership costs, 4) 
improving weapon system readiness and reliability, and 5) reducing logistics footprint.  
PBL entails buying measurable outcomes with metrics based on war fighter stated 
performance requirements.  The war-fighter requirements should be linked to metrics and 
metrics should be linked to contract incentives.  An additional element of PBL is gain 
sharing, which ensures the contractor’s profit and the government’s increased 
performance at a reduced cost.  Based on the elements of PBL, the objectives of this 
project include; 1) comparing the actions/activities/accomplishments of the contract to 
the goals of PBL, 2) measure and appraise the attainment of those goals 3) provide 
information about the major factors causing the observed effects on the above, and 4) 
identify and analyze the metrics and incentives for their effectiveness in achieving the 
desired outcomes. 
In meeting the objectives of this report, our findings indicate that non-value added 
steps were eliminated, and there were potential reductions in the logistics footprint.  On 
the other hand, the supply chain was not compressed; aircraft maintenance costs did not 
decrease; and more importantly, the APU reliability for the FA-18, S-3, and C-2 did not 
improve.  For the P-3, reliability improved by 7% to 19%, but not 300% per the contract 
 vi
guarantee.  Our research also determined that the reliability metric was inappropriate for 
measuring and tracking APU reliability improvements.  Additionally, disincentives were 
provided for not meeting contract requirements with the only contract incentive being the 
award term contract arrangement.  Our report provides recommendations specific to the 
APU TLS contract and other recommendations for other PBL applications.  These 
recommendations include an alternative contract pricing and gain sharing methods and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE 
The purpose of this MBA project is to evaluate and assess the metrics, incentives 
and other terms and conditions of the Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract 
between Naval Aviation Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) and Honeywell in support of 
FA-18/S-3/P-3/C-2 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to determine if the contractual terms 
and conditions established are effective in facilitating and encouraging the full potential 
of PBL savings and improved performance.  PBL is a fairly recent initiative and mandate 
within the Department of Defense (DoD).   The potential for savings and improved 
performance is enormous.  While the potential value of PBL is undisputed, the art of 
effective execution raises many questions regarding the achievement of PBL goals and 
efficiencies.   More is required than simply forming a public/private partnership to fully 
realize the potential of a PBL initiative.  Reviewing the anatomy and effectiveness of 
these public/private partnerships is important in determining if appropriate metrics, 
incentives, and other measures are being used to form effective contractual relationships 
that facilitate and encourage achieving the full potential of PBL savings and improved 
performance.  Our analysis of the Honeywell Total Logistics Support (TLS) contract will 
provide objective feedback and serve as a knowledge base for other PBL applications to 
use. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In accordance with the FY 2003-07 Defense Planning Guidance, DoD Directive 
5000.1 (2003a), Quadrennial Defense Review (OSD, 2001), and OSD-ATL (2002), DoD 
has mandated the use of PBL practices.  Compliance with the aforementioned directives 
has spawned many PBL initiatives within DoD.  One of the first PBL Partnerships was 
Honeywell being contracted to provide TLS for the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
common to the FA-18/S-3/P-3/C-2 aircraft.   
An APU is a small gas turbine engine, with its own subsystems and components, 
used to provide electrical, hydraulics or air pressure independent of the aircraft main 
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engines.  The APU is mainly used to start the aircraft main engines before flight and 
during ground engine runs.  The APU is also operated during ground maintenance checks 
to provide electrical or hydraulics power in the absence of support equipment.   The APU 
is rarely used in flight, except for some in-flight emergencies.  The APU models for the 
FA-18, S-3, P-3 and C-2 are the GTC36-200, GTCP36-201, GTCP-95-2/3/10, and 
GTCP36-201(C) and GTC85-116, respectively. 
According to Candreva, Hill, Marcinek, Sturken and Vince (2001), during the late 
1990s there were readiness problems with the APU common to the FA-18/S-3/P-3/C-2 
aircraft.  Aircraft availability suffered because of backlogged APU requisitions with an 
average Depot overhaul turnaround time of more than sixty days and shortages of piece 
parts required for the depot overhaul (Candreva et al., 2001).  Honeywell initially 
provided NAVICP with a proposal to conduct the depot overhaul of the APU, but 
NAVICP also wanted to fix the low readiness and parts shortages.  Additionally, Fleet 
concerns included improved availability and reliability, and reduced cost per flying hour.  
Honeywell’s second proposal, similar to commercial support practices, “provided a total 
logistics support package including overhaul, field service engineering, technical manual 
maintenance and supply chain management of the APU and associated piece parts” 
(Candreva et al., 2001).  Honeywell was subsequently contracted to provide TLS for the 
APU.   
TLS for the APU includes overall program execution, customer and engineering 
support, total asset visibility, configuration and obsolescence management, quality 
assurance, repair and overhaul of the APU, and continuous improvement with guaranteed 
increases in availability and reliability.  Under this PBL contract, Honeywell is providing 
program management, engineering expertise and process infrastructure, while 
subcontracting with Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point (NADEP CP) for the repair and 
overhaul  “touch labor” in conjunction with Caterpillar conducting third party logistics 
services such as online shipping and inventory management. 
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1. Contract Relationships 
a. Honeywell 
Honeywell Inc. was formally established in 1963 and is headquartered in 
Morristown, New Jersey.  Honeywell is a leader in technology and manufacturing of; 1) 
aerospace products and services, 2) control technologies for buildings, homes and 
industry, 3) automotive products, 4) power generation systems, and 5) specialty 
chemicals; fibers; plastics and advanced materials.  Honeywell Aerospace’s capabilities 
include systems ranging from single-engine piston-powered airplanes to commercial 
applications to military and space vehicle applications 
(http://www.honeywell.com/sites/honeywell/).   
Under the TLS APU contract, Honeywell Defense and Space Logistics, 
located in Tempe, Arizona, will execute 20 percent of the work and eighty percent will be 
performed at Cherry Point, NC (DoD, 2002). 
b. Caterpillar 
Caterpillar was established in 1925 and is headquartered in Peoria, Illinois.  
Caterpillar is a leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, natural gas 
and diesel engines, and industrial turbines.  Caterpillar also provides technology in 
construction, transportation, mining, forestry, energy, logistics, electronics, financing and 
electric power generation (http://www.cat.com/cda/layout?m=38028&x=7).  Caterpillar 
products are produced in forty-nine U.S. locations and in fifty-nine locations abroad.   
The subsidiary, Caterpillar Logistics Services, was established in 1987 to 
provide logistics know-how to other firms.  Caterpillar Logistics Services (CATLOG) 
currently serves sixty-five companies with emphasis on supply chain performance by 
providing logistics support for inbound service parts and finished goods.  Clients 
represent a variety of industries including automotive, aerospace and defense, energy, 
manufacturing, technology, communications, industrial products, and consumer durables 
(http://www.catlogistics.com/s_industry_expertise/index.html). 
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c. NAVICP  
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) provides program and supply 
support for Naval weapons systems.  NAVICP supports 5,844 aircraft, 370 ships, and 74 
submarines with annual sales of $4.2 billion.  NAVICP was formed in 1995 by merging 
the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in Philadelphia and the Ships Parts Control Center 
(SPCC) in Mechanicsburg.  The Philadelphia site focuses on aviation and weapon system 
support, whereas the Mechanicsburg site provides support for hull, electrical, mechanical 
and electronic components, and repair parts for ships, submarines, and weapon systems 
(http://www.navicp.navy.mil/abouticp/index.htm).   
In 2001, NAVICP announced that they were going to buy performance 
and manage supplier relationships in lieu of buying inventory and stocking warehouses to 
fill customer demand (Sara & Garvey, 2004).  Instead of buying inventory, the Navy will 
buy a support package with guaranteed availability, improved reliability, and 
obsolescence management (Sara & Garvey, 2004).  Moving from an inventory-based 
support approach to a performance-based concept is indicative of DoD’s implementation 
of PBL.   
Under the PBL approach, suppliers are provided incentives to take on 
additional supply chain roles typically performed by NAVICP, Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA), and depot repair activities.  By assuming these roles, the supplier acquires the 
ownership and flexibility necessary to insert improvements into various supply chain 
processes.  The supplier can then pass on these improvements to the customer in the form 
of better logistics support at lower overall costs.  This translates into improved 
performance and increased profits for the supplier, while reducing total ownership costs 
over a weapon system’s life cycle and continuing to meet customer demands.  
d. NADEP CP 
NADEP CP is one of three Navy repair depots and is located aboard 
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.  NADEP CP provides extensive 
maintenance and engineering support for Navy and Marine Corps, other military, and 
government aircraft.  Initially established in 1943 as the Overhaul and Repair 
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Department, NADEP CP has grown into a large facility covering almost 150 acres.  
Today NAPEP CP employs a variety of civilian, military, and government contracted 
workers capable of providing touch labor, repair and overhaul, and engineering support 
(http://www.nadepcp.navy.mil). 
C. SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS  
The object of our review is to evaluate and assess the metrics, incentives, and 
other terms and conditions of the PBL TLS contract between Naval Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP) and Honeywell Corporation.  This project does not focus on contractor 
performance or contract execution, but rather the effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
terms and conditions of the contract.  The current contract encompasses the FA-18/S-3/P-
3/C-2/C-130 APU, the P-3 EDC and FA-18 MFC, but we will focus only on the FA-
18/S-3/P-3/C-2 APU and other components listed in the SOW (2000) Equipment List.  A 
crucial step in establishing objective feedback is reviewing and analyzing the terms and 
conditions agreed to in the Honeywell public/private partnership.  The review and 
analysis will provide Program Managers (PM) and other government officials a 
knowledge base for forming effective contractual relationships in attaining the full 
potential of PBL through reduced total life cycle costs and improved weapon systems 
performance. 
 In providing the objective feedback, we will investigate the terms and conditions 
of the Honeywell APU TLS contract to include contract pricing, performance metrics, 
and incentives.  Contract pricing is based solely on actual flight hours flown and will be 
reviewed to determine if this arrangement is an appropriate pricing method.  We will 
examine the definition of the specified performance metrics to determine the 
effectiveness of the metric in achieving improved weapon systems performance. We will 
also assess the incentives of the contract to the extent of their ability to motivate 
contractor’s performance in achieving the desired outcomes.  Other terms and conditions 
of the contract to be examined include the gain share clause and contract exit provisions. 
Finally, we will look at the activities of the contract to determine if they achieved the 
goals of PBL which include compressing the supply chain, removing non-value added 
steps, reducing the logistics foot print and total ownership costs, and improving APU 
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reliability.  For this project, total ownership costs will be limited to Aviation Depot Level 
Repairable (AVDLR), Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM), Depot Repair, and Direct 
Maintenance Man Hours (DMMH) costs.  Additionally, identifying the specific non-
value added steps that were eliminated is beyond the scope of this project. 
A limitation of this project was the lack of scholarly journals and other resources 
specific to the Honeywell TLS APU contract.  Another limitation of this project was the 
inability to obtain a copy of the original Business Case Analysis, citing proprietary data, 
which could not be released. 
D. METHODOLOGY   
A literature review of DoD and service policies and procedures, government 
reports, magazine articles, internet-based materials and other library information was 
conducted. From these reviews, a basic understanding of the current policies and the 
elements related to PBL was developed. The review of government policy included: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), 
DoDInst 5000 series, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and various OSD, 
Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD-ATL) memorandums 
and policy statements regarding PBL. Additional information included DoD guides to 
applying and implementing PBL. 
Informal research and questions were conducted by e-mail and telephone with 
military department officials at the headquarters and major acquisition commands 
regarding the history and reasoning for the terms and conditions of the contract, and other 
pertinent information. 
Primary data was compiled and analyzed using the steps discussed below. 
1. Aircraft Maintenance Data 
Unscheduled removals were generated using the Maintenance Action Form 
(MAF) Report from the Detailed Analysis module within the Logistics Management 
Decision Support System (LMDSS), a Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
maintenance data application.  Maintenance actions at the O-level were the only records 
reviewed.  The following query filters were used. 
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Start Date: 1998-10-01 
End Date: 2004-09-30 
TEC: ACWA, AMAA, AMAE, AMAF, AMAG, APBD, APBK, ASBE 
Partno: Part Numbers are listed in SOW (2000) Attachment I, APU TLS Contract  
Equipment List 
AT Code: R 
TR Code: 23 
 
Selected data was then copied to Microsoft Excel, where the scheduled 
maintenance actions (MAL codes 800 through 811) were deleted.  Cannibalization 
actions (MAL codes 812 through 818) were counted separately from the unscheduled 
removals.  Mean Flight Hours between Unscheduled Removals (MFHBUR) was 
calculated per the definition in the Statement of Work (SOW).  Appropriate graphs and 
charts were developed using Microsoft Excel graphing functions. 
2. O-Level and I-Level Maintenance Repair Costs 
To generate monthly costs for each Type Equipment Code (TEC), the 
Reliability/Supportability/Cost Matrix report available within LMDSS was used.  The 
following filters were used: 
Start Date: 1998-10-01 
End Date: 2004-09-30 
TEC: ACWA, PBCA, PDGA, AMAA, AMAE, AMAF, AMAG, PBA,  
                                 APB, PE, ASB, PBB 
The output was compiled using Microsoft Excel.  National Item Identification 
Numbers (NIINs) from the SOW (2000) Equipment List were extracted to determine 
annual fiscal year Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR), Aviation Fleet 
Maintenance (AFM), and Direct Maintenance Man-hour (DMMH) costs.  The costs were 
discounted to FY99 dollars using LMDSS Inflation Factors Raw Index for O&MN 
(Purchases).  Appropriate graphs and charts were developed using Microsoft Excel 
graphing functions. 
3. Depot Repair Costs 
Depot repair costs were generated using the Item Value to Depot Repair Cost 
Report from the Cost Analysis Section within LMDSS. The report was run for each APU 
TEC and individual fiscal years to generate annual depot repair costs.  The costs were 
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discounted to FY99 dollars using LMDSS Inflation Factors Raw Index for O&MN/LF 
(Composite).  The following filters were used: 
Start Date: 1998-10-01 
End Date: 2004-09-30 
TEC: PBCA, PDGA, PBA, PE, PBB 
NIIN selection criteria: Select default TEC 
NIINs To Display: 100 
Sort By: Depot Repair Cost 
 
Selected data was then copied to Microsoft Excel, where the data was sorted by 
NIIN and the NIIN’s not included in the SOW (2000) Equipment List were deleted. The 
data was then sorted by date and the Depot Repair Costs were subtotaled to obtain total 
FY costs for each T/M/S. Appropriate graphs and charts were developed using Microsoft 
Excel graphing functions. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The MBA Project consists of five chapters. Chapter I is an introduction to the 
project and provides the importance, background, scope, and methodology of the project. 
Chapter II provides a review of PBL literature, including DoD and commercial 
policies, practices and definitions, to determine the elements required for a successful 
application of PBL. Specific discussion areas in establishing a PBL framework include 
the goals of PBL, appropriate metrics, and proper incentives for achieving the desired 
output. 
Chapter III uses the framework established in Chapter II and presents data 
specific to the Honeywell APU TLS PBL contract. This framework entails: Price by 
Flight Hour Rates (PBFR), Performance Metrics (availability and reliability), and Gain 
Share, compressing the supply chain, elimination of non-value added steps, cost 
elements, APU performance, the logistical footprint, and finally exit provisions.  
Chapter IV provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data presented 
in Chapter III.  
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the research and presents recommendations 
for applying PBL concepts.   
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II. PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS (PBL) 
PBL is an acquisition reform initiative to improve weapon system logistics.  The 
Defense Acquisition Guide Book (DoD, 2004) defines PBL as follows:  
The purchase of support as an integrated, affordable, performance package 
designed to optimize system readiness and meet performance goals for a weapon 
system through long-term support arrangements with clear lines of authority and 
responsibility. Application of Performance Based Logistics may be at the system, 
subsystem, or major assembly level depending on program unique circumstances 
and appropriate business case analysis (DoD, 2004). 
 
PBL is intended to buy measurable outcomes, not transactional goods and services, with 
the measures of effectiveness based on war fighter stated performance requirements.  A 
PBL strategy is an agreement in which the provider is given incentives and empowered to 
meet overarching customer oriented performance requirements to improve product 
support effectiveness.   
PBL is the preferred approach to implement product support (DoD, 2003a).  
Product support is defined as a package of logistics support functions necessary to 
maintain the readiness and operational capability of a system or subsystem.  Product 
support is an integral part of the weapon system support strategy that PMs are required to 
develop and document as part of their acquisition strategy (DoD, 2003b).  This strategy 
includes implementing PBL at the weapon systems platform level as the preferred 
weapons system support strategy.  The Government Accountability Office [GAO] (2004) 
reviewed industry PBL practices to identify industry lessons learned that could be useful 
to the DoD.  The OSD-ATL proposed guidance to adopt PBL at the platform level “could 
limit competition, might not be the most cost effective approach and is inconsistent with 
the way private sector uses PBL” (GAO, 2004).  In the air carrier industry, time and 
material contracts are more prevalent with PBL being used when appropriate system 
performance data are available for establishing a meaningful baseline for ensuring the 
contract arrangements are cost effective. 
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PBL is intended to increase weapon system readiness through cost-effective, 
integrated, logistics chains and public/private partnerships (OSD-ATL, 2004a).  PBL is a 
product service support strategy that transfers traditional organic support to the supplier 
with a guaranteed level of performance at less than or equal to current cost.  The level of 
performance for logistics support will be based on war-fighter stated performance 
requirements (OSD-ATL, 2004a).  “Instead of buying set levels of spares, repairs, tools, 
and data, the new focus is on buying a predetermined level of availability to meet the 
war-fighter’s objectives.  Program managers strive to achieve two primary objectives.  
First, the weapon system as designed, maintained, and modified must continuously 
reduce the demand for logistics.  Second, logistics support must be effective and efficient, 
and the resources required to fulfill logistics requirements, including time, must be 
minimized.  As a product support strategy, PBL serves to balance and integrate the 
support activities necessary to meet these two objectives” (OSD, 2001).  
A. GOALS OF PBL 
To achieve the above objectives, the goals of PBL include: 1) compressing the 
supply chain; 2) eliminating non-value added steps; 3) reducing total ownership costs; 4) 
improving weapon system readiness and reliability; and 5) reducing logistics footprint.  
These goals were specified by the Department of Defense (DoD) implementation of PBL 
through the following references.  The Quadrennial Defense Review calls for a business 
approach and appropriate metrics to “compress the supply chain, eliminate non-value 
added steps, reduce total ownership cost (TOC), and improve readiness” (OSD, 2001).  
OSD-ATL (2002) and in accordance with the FY 2003-07 Defense Planning Guidance, 
directed Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) to submit plans for the application of 
PBL to all new weapons systems and all fielded ACAT I and II programs (OSD-ATL, 
2002).  DoD Directive 5000.1 (2003a) directed that:  
PMs shall develop and implement PBL strategies that optimize total system 
availability while minimizing cost and logistics footprint.  Trade-off decisions 
involving cost, useful service, and effectiveness shall include the best use of 
public and private sector capabilities through government/industry partnering 
initiatives, in accordance with statutory requirements (DoD, 2003a). 
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At the user level, Naval Air Systems Command Instruction (NAVAIRINST) 
4081.2A (2004b) draws upon the higher level documents and prescribes eight principles 
for a successful PBL program.  The eight principles are as follows: 
1. It procures an outcome (stated as a level of performance) rather than specific 
products or services. 
2. It incentivizes the provider by linking payment to actual performance. 
Incentives may include firm fixed type contracts, extended contract periods, and 
monetary incentives. It also provides program stability, which allows providers to 
make long term commitments resulting in cost savings to both the contractor and 
the Navy. 
3. It implements realistic, easily understood performance metrics. Performance 
metrics for PBLs will be stated in terms of readiness, availability, reliability, etc. 
4. It tells the provider what the government wants instead of how to do it. 
However, the Government reserves the right to direct engineering changes, when 
necessary. NAVAIR will generally issue a Statement of Objectives (SOO) for the 
PBL that provides top-level program objectives and allows providers maximum 
flexibility in tailoring and proposing an innovative and cost effective Statement of 
Work (SOW) to satisfy the SOO requirements. 
5. The PBL should empower the provider with the authorization and 
responsibility to control those elements required to successfully support the 
program. The following are examples of the functions that may be delegated to 
the provider: 
 Obsolescence Management 
 Public/Private Partnerships 
 Requirements Determination and Acquisition 
 Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation 
 Warehousing 
 Engineering and Technical Services 
 Technology Insertion 
 Configuration Management 
 Retrograde Management 
 FMS Support (if applicable) 
6. It reduces the logistics footprint. 
7. It has minimal or no impact to the Fleet. This means the PBL is essentially 
transparent, posing no additional tasking on Fleet maintainers and no additional 
impact to any other product support elements.   
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8. It mitigates long term risk by ensuring exit provisions are included in the 
contract/agreement to facilitate the re-establishment of organic or commercial 
support capability, if needed (NAVAIR, 2004b). 
The above principles reinforce the goals of PBL and provide for, among other 
things, easily understood performance metrics and incentives to achieve the required 
performance.   
B. METRICS 
A guiding principle in conducting a business case analysis (BCA) for PBL states: 
“war fighter requirements will be linked to metrics and metrics will be linked to contract 
incentives” (OSD-ATL, 2004a).  The requirements will be documented in a Performance 
Based Agreement (PBA), which specifies the objectives of logistics support agreed upon 
by the war fighter and the PM.  The PBA is the foundation for the PBL program and will 
be used to conduct the BCA and write the Request for Proposal (RFP), SOO and 
Statement of Work (SOW). 
As stated above, the PBA provides the foundation for the PBL effort.  The 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook states:  
For Performance Based Logistics, “performance” is defined in terms of military 
objectives, using the following criteria: 
1. Operational Availability. The percent of time that a weapon system is available 
for a mission or ability to sustain operations tempo. 
2. Operational Reliability. The measure of a weapon system in meeting mission 
success objectives (percent of objectives met, by weapon system). Depending on 
the weapon system, a mission objective would be a sortie, tour, launch, 
destination reached, capability, etc. 
3. Cost per Unit Usage. The total operating costs divided by the appropriate unit 
of measurement for a given weapon system. Depending on weapon system, the 
measurement unit could be flight hour, steaming hour, launch, mile driven, etc. 
4. Logistics Footprint. The government / contractor size or “presence” of logistics 
support required to deploy, sustain, and move a weapon system. Measurable 
elements include inventory / equipment, personnel, facilities, transportation 
assets, and real estate. 
5. Logistics Response Time. This is the period of time from logistics demand 
signal sent to satisfaction of that logistics demand. “Logistics Demand” refers to 
systems, components, or resources, including labor, required for weapon system 
logistics support (DoD, 2004). 
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The Guidebook further states that: “PBL metrics should support these desired 
outcomes” (DoD, 2004). 
Table 1.   NAVAIRINST 4081.2A Performance Metrics 
Performance Outcomes Metrics/Considerations 
Operational Availability (Ao) A(o) - (Under Full CLS Only) 
Readiness 
Mission Capable Rates 
Sortie Generation Rate 
Turn- Around-Times 
Surge Requirements 
Reduced Down Time 
Operational Reliability Sortie/Mission Completions 
Time On Wing 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
MTBF Improvement 
No Fault Found/Reduction Elimination 
Cost Per Unit Usage Cost Per Flight Hour 
Annual FFP Cost (prorated by units) 
Obsolescence Management 
Attrition Replacement 
Sustaining Engineering/ECP Costs 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 








Logistics Response Time Parts Availability 
First Pass Effectiveness 
Maintainability 
P,H,S&T 
Mean Logistics Down Time 
Supply Chain Management 
Source: NAVAIR, 2004b 
As shown in Table 1, NAVAIR (2004b) provides a list of individual performance 
metrics to address the above performance categories.  The issue with Table 1 is that 
excess metrics can make managing the PBL program extremely difficult and costly, 
negating the benefits of PBL.  This same instruction states: “develop a few simple 
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metrics with dependable measurement tools” (NAVAIR, 2004b).  The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2004) also suggests; “focusing on a few outcome measures 
such as weapon system availability, mission reliability, logistics footprint and overall 
system readiness levels” (DoD, 2004).  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook and the 
Program Managers Guide (DoD, 2001) then provides a list of top-level performance 
outcomes, which is in contrast to focusing on a few outcome measures.  This list includes 
“requisition fulfillment rate, customer wait time, ratio of supply chain costs to sales, 
maintenance repair turnaround time, and so on” (DoD, 2001) and “outcomes include, but 
are not limited to, not mission capable supply (NMCS), ratio of supply chain costs to 
sales, maintenance repair turnaround time, depot cycle time, and negotiated time definite 
delivery” (DoD, 2004). 
According to Doerr, Eaton, and Lewis (2004), “since PBL buys outcomes then the 
focus should be on the significant output measurements and those process measurements 
where an operational decision depends on that process information.”  Significant output 
measurements would include operational availability and weapon system reliability.  
Process measurements are related to the series of events required to produce an end item 
or service such as repairing or overhauling an APU or other spare parts.  The process 
measurements where an operational decision would depend on the information would 
include maintenance repair turnaround time, depot cycle time, and requisition fulfillment 
rate.  Process measurement metrics should only be used when they add value and an 
operational decision depends on that information. 
NAVAIR (2004b) provides additional considerations for establishing appropriate 
metrics.  These considerations include the following: “1) use of war fighter 
supportability-related performance requirements, 2) identification of realistic, consistent 
and readily quantifiable metrics, 3) identification of the source and data to be collected, 
4) identification of roles and responsibilities for analysis and reporting of performance 
data, 5) description for the data elements and formula for calculating the critical metrics, 
and 6) statement of the frequency and format for reporting results” (NAVAIR 2004b). 
Based on the above, a successful PBL program would select only a few realistic, 
consistent, and easily quantifiable outcome measures of effectiveness focused on 
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significant operational performance and those value added process measurements.  
Additionally, according to Kotlanger and Giuntini (2005), the activity responsible for the 
metric should have control of the variables that affect the metric.  Basically, contracting 
for operational availability is difficult because the contractor does not have control of all 
of the inputs such as maintenance, training, spare parts, etc.  The PM should specify the 
higher metric and then let the contractor decide the lower metrics required to achieve the 
goal.  If the PM specifies the lower metrics, then the contractor loses the flexibility to 
efficiently meet the performance goals. 
C. CONTRACT TYPES 
As established by OFPP and OMB (2005), contract types vary in terms of degree 
and timing of risk assumed by the contractor and the amount and nature of the profit 
incentive offered to the contractor for meeting or exceeding specified standards or goals.  
Government contracts are designed to obtain specific acquisition objectives by: “1) 
establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly communicated to the 
contractor; and 2) including appropriate incentive arrangements designed to motivate 
contractor efforts that might not other wise be emphasized and discourage contractor 
inefficiency and waste” (OFPP & OMB, 2005).   
On each side of the contractual spectrum lie two categories of contracts.  At one 
end of the contractual spectrum is the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contract, under which the 
contractor is fully responsible for performance costs and enjoys (or suffers) resulting 
profits (or losses).  At the other end of the spectrum is the Cost-Reimbursement (CR) 
Contract, in which allowable and allocated costs are reimbursed and the negotiated fee 
(profit) is fixed, whereby the contractor has minimal responsibility for or incentive to 
control performance costs.  As you move from one end of the spectrum to the other, each 
category of contract is broken down into type specific contracts, which are designed 
around risk and incentives.  Risk is the driving factor as to which type of contract under 
these two categories will be utilized by the Government to limit risk while 
simultaneously providing the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and 
economical performance (Hearn, 2001).  The various contract types in a PBSSA 
agreement are discussed below. 
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1. Fixed Price Contracts 
The basic types of fixed price contracts are firm-fixed-price and fixed-price with 
economic price adjustment.  Fixed price contracts are the standard business pricing 
arrangement and according to OSD (2004b), “wherever possible PBL contracts should be 
fixed price (e.g., fixed price per operating or system operating hour).”  “Under fixed price 
contracts the contractor agrees to supply specified goods or deliverables in a specified 
quantity or to tender a specified service or level of effort (LOE) in return for a specified 
price, either lump sum or a unit price” (Garrett, 2001). Under fixed price type contracts, 
the risk is shifted mostly onto the contractor to deliver the goods or services agreed upon 
and allows for potential higher profit for the contractor due to the contractor controlling 
his costs.  The fixed price contract provides maximum incentive for the contractor to 
control costs and minimizes the administrative burden on the Government. 
2. Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
The basic types of cost-reimbursement contracts are cost-plus-fixed fee, cost-plus-
award fee, and cost-plus-incentive fee.  “Cost-reimbursement contracts usually include an 
estimate of project cost, a provision for reimbursing the seller’s expenses, and a provision 
for paying a fee as profit” (Garrett, 2001).  Use of cost-reimbursement contracts require 
certain measures not used with fixed-price contracts such as definition, measurement, 
allocation, and conformation of costs due to the shift in risk to the buyer.   
3. Incentive Fee Contracts 
Incentive fee contracts are designed to obtain specific acquisition objectives by 
relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor’s 
performance.  Incentive fee contracts can be either FP or CR type contracts and are 
tailored towards the amount of risk the Government feels the contractor can assume.  
Fixed-price incentive contracts are preferred when project cost and performance are 
reasonably certain and a final price ceiling is negotiated at the outset.  Cost-
reimbursement incentive contracts are tailored to the overall cost-reimbursement 
agreements that are built around a target cost, target fee, minimum and maximum fees 
and a fee adjustment formula (FAR 16.405). 
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4. Award Fee Contracts 
“Award fee contracts provide a means of applying incentives in contracts that are 
not susceptible to finite measurements of performance necessary for structuring incentive 
contracts” (Garrett, 2001).  The two types of award fee contracts are fixed-price award 
fee (FPAF) and cost-plus-award fee (CPAF).  Under FPAF contracts, cost incentives are 
not applied until the completion of the contract.  Any award fee earned will be paid in 
addition to the fixed price.  The fee established in a CPAF contract consists of a base fee 
and an award fee pool.  “The base fee is a set amount that does not vary with 
performance, while the award fee pool is used as a motivator for contractor performance 
in areas such as quality, timeliness, and cost effectiveness” (Hearn, 2002).    
5. Award Term Contracts 
With award term contracts, the government establishes objective outcomes that it 
wants the provider to deliver.  Successful performance leads to a longer-term contract 
period without having to compete for the award.  Conversely, unsuccessful performance 
means a shorter contract period.  This approach enables providers to make investments to 
improve performance and reduce costs that they might not otherwise make when facing 
uncertainty or short-term periods of performance (DoD, 2001).  Additionally, rewarding 
contractors with long-term relationships may provide a more powerful incentive than 
extra profit.  “Profit earned over an extended period of time is better aligned with the 
strategic goals of the company; therefore, exerts greater influence on contractor 
performance” (Stevens & Yoder, 2005).   Award term contracts facilitate the “preferred 
PBL contracting approach by using long term contracts with incentives tied to 
performance that provide industry with a firm period of performance” (OSD, 2004b). 
D. INCENTIVES 
Incentives are an essential element in unleashing the contractor’s creativity and 
are the basis for Performance-Based Service Agreements (PBSA).  To ensure successful 
PBSA contracts, incentives should be built upon performance objectives and standards.  
The incentives are based on meeting target performance standards, not minimum contract 
length.  The performance objectives and standards specified must be measurable and 
attainable.   
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Incentives should be applied selectively to motivate contractor efforts in areas that 
might not be emphasized, and to discourage inefficiencies.  Incentives should apply to the 
most important aspects of the work, rather than the individual task.  Incentives are 
especially useful in efforts that are complex, have high-dollar value, or have a history of 
performance or cost overrun problems.  Incentives should correlate with results.  
Agencies should avoid rewarding contractors for simply meeting minimum standards of 
contract performance, and create a proper balance between cost, performance, and 
schedule incentives to achieve or exceed program goals. 
Incentives can be monetary, non-monetary, positive, or negative and should 
reflect value to both the government and the contractor.  The incentives can be based on 
cost, schedule, or performance.  Under a negative or disincentive, if the contractor fails to 
meet a specified performance metric, then the government would penalize the contractor 
by levying a monetary penalty at time of payment.  As the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy [OFPP] and Office of Management and Budget [OMB] (1998) states: “The 
incentive amount should correspond to the difficulty of the task required, but should not 
exceed the value of benefits the government receives.”  OSD-ATL (2001) also states: 
“regardless of the final composition and structure of the contract, the goal is to encourage 
and motivate the contractor’s optimal performance for logistical support through reduced 
cycle time, reduced inventory, improved reliability/obsolescence management, and 
reduced total ownership costs.” 
One of the keys to motivate the contractor’s optimal performance involves 
recognizing and acting on the private sector’s profit motive.  For a contractor in the 
application of PBL, revenue is not important.  According to Kotlanger and Giuntini 
(2005), the contractor has to have a material improvement in profit.  “Without an 
improvement in profit there is no incentive to take on the risks associated with PBL 
programs” (Kotlanger & Giuntini 2005).  Cost, performance, and delivery incentives are 
all examples of rewards that can motivate a contractor to improve performance and 
reliability, thereby increasing the contractor’s profit and the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the government’s weapon system.  In the application of PBL, revenue will stay the 
same or decrease, but the contractor actively reduces costs to achieve efficiency and 
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effectiveness, thereby creating more profit.  The government, source of revenue for the 
contractor, pays less.  The contractor refines their processes, while expanding his profit 
margins.  Weapon system performance (availability, reliability and supportability) and 
process efficiency (operations, maintenance and logistics) are increased.  For PBL to be 
successful, the government has to allow higher profits and not re-baseline contracts once 
the contractor begins to realize profit. 
According to Kotlanger and Giuntini (2005), gain sharing can be used as an 
incentive to not re-baseline contracts.  “Gain sharing recognizes both the government’s 
and contractor’s self interests by providing incentives versus penalties, empowerment 
versus oversight, Profits as incentives versus capped profits” (Kotlanger & Giuntini 
2005).  Gain sharing involves allowing the contractor his profit, but then providing the 
government greater performance (reliability) rather than re-baselining the contract.  The 
contractor gain shares with the government by providing greater reliability, while 
charging the government at a lower rate (i.e., 92% reliability at a rate for 90%).  Both 
parties win because the contractor is profitable and the government gets better 
performance. 
E. ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL PBL APPLICATION 
PBL should be used when appropriate data are available for establishing a 
meaningful baseline for ensuring the contract arrangements are cost effective.  The PBL 
application must achieve the goals of PBL.  These goals are as follows: 1) compressing 
the supply chain; 2) eliminating non-value added steps; 3) reducing total ownership costs; 
4) improving weapon system readiness and reliability; and 5) reducing logistics footprint.  
Additionally, as specified by NAVAIR (2004), exit provisions should be included in the 
contract/agreement to facilitate the re-establishment of organic or commercial support 
capability, if needed.   
In meeting the above goals, a successful PBL program should buy measurable 
outcomes with measures of effectiveness based on war-fighter-stated performance 
requirements.  War-fighter requirements should be linked to metrics and metrics should 
be linked to contract incentives.  The measures of effectiveness should include only a 
few, simple, realistic, consistent and easily quantifiable metrics focused on operational 
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performance and value added process indicators.  Additionally, the PM should specify the 
higher operational metric and then empower the contractor with the flexibility and control 
to meet the operational performance goal. 
According to OSD (2004b), the preferred performance based contracting 
approach is the use of long-term contracts (fixed price per unit of output or fixed price 
per unit per period) with incentives tied to performance objectives and standards that are 
measurable and attainable.  An incentive to fully achieve the goals of PBL and to take on 
the associated risks is to allow the contractor to maximize profit through actively 
reducing costs and achieving efficient and effective operations.  To gain maximum 
performance and program stability the government should allow higher profits and not re-
baseline contracts.  Payment of incentives, an essential part of PBSAs, should be directly 
linked to actual contractor performance and not duration of contract or other factors.    
The results of a successful PBL program would include the government paying less for 
services, the contractor improving his bottom line, and increasing weapon systems 




This chapter uses the elements of a successful PBL application developed in the 
previous chapter as a framework for presenting the data and subsequent analysis specific 
to the terms and conditions of the Honeywell APU TLS PBL contract.  The data to be 
presented includes PBFR, Performance Metrics (availability and reliability), incentives, 
the gain share clause, and exit provisions.  Additional data to be presented consists of the 
actions, activities and accomplishments of the contract in pursuing the goals of PBL. 
A. AVAILABLE DATA 
The FA-18, S-3, C-2 and P-3 aircraft have logged thousands of flight hours while 
engaged in worldwide deployments and conflicts ranging from the attacks against Libya 
to Operation Desert Storm to ongoing Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The P-3 entered the 
Navy’s inventory during July 1962, with the P-3C model being operational since 1969.  
The last new P-3C rolled off the factory floor during April 1990.  The first C-2A’s flew 
during 1964, while the S-3B entered service during 1975.  In 1984 thirty-nine new C-
2A’s were re-procured, while the older C-2A’s were retired during 1987.  The FA-18A/B 
models first flew during November 1978 and have been operational since October 1983.  
The FA-18C/D models have been in operation since a 1987 block upgrade to the FA-
18A/B’s.  From their first flights, these aircraft have flown from shore bases and sea 
platforms in many different environments representing the full spectrum of factors that 
provide a complete picture of operational and logistical characteristics. 
B. CONTRACT 
“The contract awarded is a fixed price ten year Requirements contract.  The 
contract includes a five year base ordering period and five additional one-year ordering 
periods” (SOW, 2000).  The five additional one-year ordering periods will be awarded 
individually based on the contractor meeting the performance metrics (availability and 
reliability) specified in the contract.  The only exception to the fixed price is annual lump 
sum equitable adjustments based on changing labor rates at NADEP Cherry Point. 
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Execution of the contract is provided in three phases.  Phase I is the transition 
phase, which includes setting up the infrastructure, material and systems required to 
accomplish the TLS Program.  Pricing for Phase I is based on a flat rate repair pricing 
schedule.  Phase II is the TLS Program, which started on March 01, 2001.  The TLS 
Program includes “the contractor supplying effort to provision, stock, repair, store and 
ship ready-for-issue (RFI) APUs directly to the user upon demand while meeting the 
performance requirements for availability and reliability” (SOW, 2000).  Additional 
functions delegated to the contractor include obsolescence management, technology 
insertion, configuration management, and engineering and technical services.  Pricing for 
Phase II is based on price by flight hour rates (PBFR).  Phase III provides for exit 
provisions. 
1. Price by Flight Hour Rates (PBFR) 
Pricing for Phase II of the contract is provided on a cost per usage basis, which is 
based solely on actual aircraft flight hours flown.  According to Tonoff,  
The PBFR rates were established based on existing factors such as obsolescence, 
reliability, level of repair required and readily available technology insertion.  The 
FA-18’s PBFR is less than other aircraft, because the FA-18’s APU reliability is 
better (fewer unscheduled removals) and the FA-18 inventory is much larger and 
provides a greater base to allocate fixed and start-up costs than other aircraft (G. 
D. Tonoff, personal communication, August 26, 2005). 
The contract provides two PBFRs, except for the C-2, with yearly increases over the life 
of the contract.  The higher PBFR rate is used when the actual flight hours exceed the 
following levels: FA-18 – 120,000 hours, P-3 – 60,000 hours, and the S-3 – 22,500 hours.  
The C-2 aircraft carries only one PBFR Rate.     
    
(Estimated Annual Flight Hours)X(PBFR) Estimated Annual Contract Payment 
- Availability Adjustment Penalty for Parts Availability <90% 
-Reliability Adjustment Penalty for not achieving Reliability Guarantee 
-Gain Share Adjustment  
+- NADEP CP Labor Rate adjustment  
Annual Payment  
Figure 1.   Contract Payment Formula  
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The estimated annual contract payment, shown in Figure 1, is calculated by 
multiplying the government’s annual estimated flight hours by the PBFRs.  The annual 
contract payment is then divided by twelve months to determine the estimated monthly 
contractor invoice amount.  On a monthly basis, the contractor invoices the government 
for actual aircraft flight hours flown, which are then multiplied by the PBFRs.  Every six 
months, the government and contractor reconcile between estimated and actual flight 
hours.  The money the contractor actually receives is adjusted annually for not meeting 
the performance metrics, for gain share adjustments and NADEP CP Labor Rate 
adjustments.   
2. Performance Metrics 
a. Availability 
The SOW (2000) defines availability as: “the number of requisitions 
delivered within specified timeframes divided by the total number of requisitions 
received by the contractor, expressed as a percent”.  The contractor is expected to 
maintain at least 90% availability and is monetarily penalized for each percentage point 
below 90%.  The penalty amount increases for availability equal to or less than 82%.  
Additionally, per the SOW (2000), the Government is required to return all retrograde to 
the contractor facility within thirty days after removal.  If the retrograde is not returned 
within a timely manner, then the contractor can relax the availability performance metric 
to the level of the Government’s Retrograde Return performance with associated 
reductions in penalties.  “If the Government’s Retrograde Return performance is rated at 
87% then the contractor is only required to provide availability at 87% with subsequent 
3% reductions in penalty assessments” (SOW, 2000). 
To establish the availability penalty, a total pool of money was negotiated 
for disincentives.  According to Tonoff, “most of the money was earmarked for delivery 
response time vice reliability as PBFR inherently provides incentives to improve 
reliability” (G. D. Tonoff, personal communication, August 26, 2005). 
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b. Reliability 
The SOW (2000) defines reliability as:  
The Mean Flight Hours Between Unscheduled Removals (MFHBUR) of the APU 
assembly at the O-level. Unscheduled Removals includes all APU removals 
except those removed for Scheduled Maintenance, to facilitate access to other 
equipment or to update equipment (SOW, 2000). 
MFHBUR is calculated as: “the total aircraft flight hours divided by the 
total unscheduled APU removals” (SOW, 2000).   
The contract provides for guaranteed reliability improvements over the life 
of the contract at a fixed price.  The guaranteed improvements are: FA-18 – 45%, P-3 – 
300%, S-3 – 25%, and the C-2 – 15% (SOW, 2000).  The contractor is expected “to apply 
the resources necessary to measure and improve MFHBUR during Phase II of the APU 
TLS Program” (SOW, 2000).  The contractor is monetarily penalized for not meeting 
reliability improvement guarantees.  To establish the reliability adjustment, a total pool of 
money was negotiated for disincentives.  According to Tonoff, the reliability pool of 
money was established and then allocated over the number of aircraft with the C-2 being 
allotted proportionately less money than the other platforms (G. D. Tonoff, personal 
communication, August 26, 2005).   
3. Gain Share 
According to Tonoff,  
The Government will share in contract cost avoidances/savings in the event 
realized reliability improvements are greater than twenty five percent above the 
guaranteed minimum improvement identified for each aircraft platform.  Above 
the twenty-five percent threshold, Honeywell will gain share with the 
Government at a rate of fifty percent of the cost avoidance (Tonoff, 2000). 
Additionally, the SOW (2000) provides that: “If, after three years of PBFH performance, 
actual APU Mean Flight Hours Between Depot Demand (MFHBD) is equal to or greater 
than the Gain Share criteria, the contractor agrees to gain share with the government 50% 
of the APU repair cost avoidance.  The gain share formula is shown in Figure 2.  The 
gain share amount is recalculated each year during the annual payment reconciliation. 
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   Predicted APU’s repaired at Depot 
- Actual APUs Repaired at Depot 
x Flat Rate APU Repair Price 
   Repair Cost Avoidance 
x 50% 
Figure 2.   Gain Share Adjustment Formula 
 
C. COMPRESS THE SUPPLY THE CHAIN 
NAVSUP (2004) and Cruz (1997) describe the Naval Aviation Supply chain for 
Depot Level Repairables (DLR).  This description is diagrammed in Appendix A and 
discussed below.  Figure 3.1 in Cruz (1997) provides a detailed NADEP Induction Flow.   
The appendix and the description below is a basic view of the system, which is much 
more complicated and dynamic than described and depicted in our report. 
Traditionally, DLR components are removed at the O-level and sent to the I-level 
for repair.  For repairs completed at the I-level, parts are supplied by the Supply 
Department.  “DLRs must be returned to the Designated Support Point (DSP) or 
Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) when they are Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM) 
(not locally repairable) at the I-level” (NAVSUP, 2004).  If determined to be BCM, the 
unit must be expeditiously shipped to the nearest Advanced Traceability and Control 
(ATAC) Node for collection, consolidation and trans-shipment to one of two ATAC 
regional hubs (East and West).  The ATAC Hub provides long haul shipping to the 
Defense Distribution Depot (DDD) for storage and eventual delivery to NADEP CP per 
Designated Support Point (DSP) or Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) direction.  At 
NADEP CP, units are inducted and repaired and then returned to the DDD for storage 
and eventual delivery to the I-level.  Upon receipt of the RFI item, the I-level restocks 
their supply shelves with the asset.  APU consumables in support of repairs at NADEP 
CP are requested by a parts order from Depot artisans to the DSP or FISC with parts 
provided from the DDD.  The DSP or FISC restock the DDD via NAVICP, DLA, and 
other FISCs.   
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Under the new arrangement, components are still removed at the O-level and 
processed for higher repairs via the I-level, the ATAC Node, and ATAC Hub.  NRFI 
assets are sent to the Caterpillar Logistics (CatLog) warehouse instead of the DDD for 
forwarding to the Depot.  As depicted in Appendix B, CatLog appears to be inserted into 
the DLR supply chain as a parallel entity to the DDD.  CatLog, a Honeywell 
subcontractor, is now responsible for storing APU specific components and consumables 
and shipping to and from NADEP CP.  Additionally, per the SOW (2000), Honeywell 
assumes responsibility for APU consumables management..  According to IG (2000), 
1,503 consumables, in support of NADEP CP APU repairs, have been transferred from 
DLA management to Honeywell control.  “DLA is a supply support organization, which 
is assigned management responsibility and control of items (3 and 9 cognizance symbol 
except 3H and 9Q) in common use by all military services” (NAVSUP, 2004).  The 
transfer of consumables was made despite NADEP CP being the highest DoD consumer, 
with 34% of the requisitions for the APU specific consumable items (IG, 2000).  DLA 
continues to maintain the same consumable inventory for other DoD customers. 
D. ELIMINATE NON-VALUE ADDED STEPS 
Identifying the specific non-value added steps that were eliminated is beyond the 
scope of this project, but the following results are indicators of the elimination of non-
value added steps: 
• APUs awaiting depot repair from 118 to zero 
• Backorders reduced from 125 to 26 to zero 
• Average Delivery Time from 35 days to 5.4 days 
• 98% requisitions filled 
• Supply Material Availability from 65% to 95% 
(Source: Lucyshyn, et al., 2005) 
 
• Depot TAT from 162 days to 38 days 
• Increased depot production by 70% 
• Decreased labor hours by 47% 
(Source: Sara & Garvey, 2004) 
 
These indicators suggest improved efficiencies, but the direct link between these 
indicators and the PBL contract is not clear.  There is a possibility that these efficiencies 
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were realized as a result of other variables that coincided with the NAVICP’s PBL 
initiative and subsequent TLS contract with Honeywell.   
According to HASC (2001), NADEP CP completed ISO 9000 certification in 
1999, employed the Theory of Constraints and implemented Manufacturing Resource 
Planning (MRP II) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) to offset increasing costs and 
repair cycles, reduce bottlenecks, counter material delays, and align production priorities 
with organizational goals (HASC, 2001).  “Other best business practices implemented by 
NADEP CP include process consolidation, digitized publications and electronic 
availability of technical data” (JDMAG, 2005).     
In addition to NADEP CP’s initiatives, Honeywell implemented the best 
commercial practices for technology insertion, configuration management, and material 
management.  Material management includes forecasting, procurement, and stocking of 
components required for the repair and overhaul of the APU and subcomponents.  These 
efforts, among other things, improved the screening of NRFI assets was from an average 
9.5 days to an average 2.5 days by reducing the misidentification of assets at the depot 
induction point.  CatLog further streamlined the process by receiving units directly from 
the Fleet and positively identifying the item upon arrival rather than waiting for induction 
into the D-level.  Implementing bar-coding of Repair Orders (RO) and serial numbers 
improved the material requisitioning process by improving accuracy, reducing rejections 
and delays for material delivery, and decreasing overall turnaround time (TAT) by three 
to five workdays per unit.  The process was further improved by implementing electronic 
transmission of the work order directly to the CatLog warehouse and using online 
shipping and inventory management. 
E. MAINTENANCE COST ELEMENTS 
The Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) is a revolving account that relies on 
sales, AVDLR charges, rather than annual budget appropriations to finance operations 
such as Depot repair services.  NWCF uses AVDLR charges and other surcharges to 
finance the fund on a break-even basis.  An AVDLR charge (Net price of the asset) to the 
Fleet occurs when an I-level activity determines that the required repairs are beyond their 
capability of maintenance (BCM) and then transfers the asset to the Depot for repair.  An 
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AVDLR charge, at a higher rate (Unit price of the asset), can also be incurred when a 
repairable asset is lost or missing.  With the above process, the customer finances the 
 
Figure 3.   APU Net Price Reductions 
 
Depot repairs.  As shown in Figure 3, during FY01, start of Phase II for the APU TLS 
contract, the APU’s Net Price (AVDLR charge) was reduced by 22%, 32%, 55% and 
67% for the P-3, C-2, S-3, and FA-18, respectively.  These significant reductions in Net 
Price were made “due to maintenance changes, Tier 1 pricing and and TLS contract 
savings” (DoDIG, 2001) and represents significant cost savings to the Fleet. 
In determining overall costs, AVDLR, AFM, DMMH, and Depot Repair costs for 
each aircraft were analyzed to determine if these costs increased, decreased or resulted in 
no change at all.  To avoid double counting costs, the greater of AVDLR or contract cost 
will be used in calculating total costs since AVDLR is used to pay for the contract.  Cost 




Table 2.   Cost Element Column Definitions 
Column Heading Remarks 
AVDLR COST Total repairable component costs 
AFM COST Total consumable item cost 
DMMH COST Total Direct Maintenance Man Hour costs 
DEPOT REPAIR COST Total Depot Repair cost 
ESTIMATED CONTRACT COST Total estimated Contract costs 
TOTAL COSTS Sum of the above costs using the greater of 
AVDLR or Estimated Contract Costs 
 
F. APU PERFORMANCE 
APU performance data is provided in Appendices IV and V.  The explanation for 
each column heading is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   APU Performance Column Definitions 
Column Heading Remarks 
DATE Year and month 
FLTS TOT Total number of actual flights for the month 
FHRS TOT Total actual flight hours for the month 
REMS Total number of unscheduled removals at the 
Organizational level for the month.  Does not include 
scheduled maintenance or cannibalizations 
CANNS Total number of cannibalization actions during the month. 
MFHBUR Mean Flight Hours Between Unscheduled Removals.  
Calculated by dividing FHRS TOT by REMS. 
MFLTSBUR Mean Number of Flights Between Unscheduled Removals.  
Calculated by dividing FLTS TOT by REMS. 
 
G. LOGISTICS FOOTPRINT 
 As established earlier in this document, reliability improvements, reduced 
cannibalizations, staffing levels, inventory/equipment needs, facilities, training, 
publications, and transportation assets are the elements to review to determine if the 
logistics footprint was reduced or not.   
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1. Reliability Improvements and Cannibalizations 
As discussed in the analysis of APU performance, the only aircraft that 
demonstrated improved reliability is the P-3.  As shown in Table 4, the number of 
cannibalizations show a decreasing trend.  Cannibalizations increased for the FA-18 and 
P-3 during FY02 and FY03 due to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.   
2. Staffing Levels, Inventory and Equipment Needs, and Facilities  
The SOW (2000) requires the government to provide a dedicated Procuring 
Contracting Officer (PCO) and Weapon Systems Manager (WSM).  Per the SOW (2000), 
the PCO and WSM will act as primary points of contacts to the Contractor’s PM for 
coordinating semiannual Program Management Reviews and oversight and management 
of the APU TLS contract.  The SOW (2000) also establishes a Customer Satisfaction 
Board (CSB).  The CSB includes government representatives to resolve configuration 
management issues. 
Under the PBL contract, the maintenance plan changed with first-degree and 
second-degree repair of the APU at the I-level being transferred to the D-level at NADEP 
CP.  The government is still responsible for on-equipment work at the O-level.  The O-
level on-equipment work encompasses removing and replacing the APU assembly from 
the aircraft and some APU external components.  First-degree and second-degree repair 
of the APU entails major engine inspections, and complete tear down and overhaul.  
Third-degree repair includes preparing the APU for shipment and installation, 
preservation actions, building up and installing quick engine change kits, removal and 
replacement of external components, and test and check operations on the aircraft engine 
test cell.  According to NAVAIR (2004a), only third-degree repair actions are authorized 
at the I-level activities, both ashore and afloat, except for MALS-11.  Per NAVAIR 
Table 4.   Cannibalizations 
 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 
P-3 1 1 6 4 6 0 
C-2 2 1 0 0 1 0 
S-3 7 5 3 0 0 0 
FA-18 8 5 6 12 4 5 
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(2004a), MALS-11 is the only activity authorized first-degree repair on the GTCP36 
APU. 
For manpower, according to TECOM (2002) and NAVPERS (2004), a Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) or Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) is assigned to a 
Power Plants Mechanic (USMC) or Aviation Machinist’s Mate (Navy) for both the 
aircraft engine and the APU.  As an example, MOS 6227 is responsible for repairing both 
the F404-GE-400/402 FA-18 engine and the GTCP36-200 APU.   
For inventory and equipment needs, additional tools, test equipment, and 
maintenance fixtures and stands are required to conduct first-degree and second-degree 
maintenance over third-degree repairs. By eliminating first-degree and second-degree 
repair at the I-level, there is a potential for reduction in assets. 
For facilities, as stated above, third-degree repair entails test and check operations 
requiring test cells and other equipment.  Therefore, hangar bays, work centers and test 
cells remain in support of APU third-degree repair actions and other type model series 
engines and aircraft.  
3. Training 
TECOM (2002) and NAVPERS (2004) have not been updated to reflect third-
degree engine repair at the I-level and still calls for qualifications in APU systems and 
major APU engine inspections.  In addition to the MOS/NEC training, and at no 
additional cost to the Government, the contractor may provide informal field maintenance 
and operations training at the contractor’s discretion.  Per the SOW (2000), this training 
may be classroom instruction or on-the-job-training (OJT) and will include O-level and I-
level operations and maintenance of support equipment and facilities for testing.  
Honeywell Field Service Engineers (FSE) conducts the contractor training.  
4. Publications 
Per the SOW (2000), the contractor is responsible for: 
 Maintaining Intermediate and Depot level maintenance publications 
 Issuing change notices to maintain accuracy of publications 
 Updating Organizational publications when required due to contractor 
modifications that affect Organizational level maintenance 
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 Issuing Interim Rapid Action Changes (IRACs) from the contractor to the 
PCO 
 Providing technical publication revisions via paper copy 
NAVAIR and NATEC remain responsible for maintaining, printing, distributing, 
and updating publications in support of the entire aircraft minus the APU.  NATEC is 
also responsible for providing updated distribution lists and remain responsible for APU 
O-level publications.   
5.  Transportation Assets 
Per the SOW (2000), “the contractor shall ship all RFI requisitioned equipment to 
continental United States (CONUS) destinations and to OCONUS locations per specified 
attachments and schedules to meet the availability requirements”.  The SOW (2000) also 
specifies that: “the Government shall return all retrograde equipment to the contractor’s 
facility at the government’s expense”  
The Government is still responsible for retrograde of equipment because “having 
the contractor cover the sheer number of sites and ships that would need to be covered on 
a daily basis would be financially infeasible” (G. D. Tonoff, personal communication, 
August 26, 2005). 
H. EXIT PROVISIONS 
The SOW (2000) provides that: “upon completion or termination of the contract, 
the contractor will transfer performance responsibility back to the government, while 
taking all precautions necessary to ensure that fleet readiness is not adversely impacted.”  
The SOW (2000) also requires, at no additional cost to the government, the 
following: 
 Written current status for the following: 
o Quantity and condition of any Government Furnished Property (GFP) 
accountable to the Contractor to be returned during Phase III. 
o Quantity of Contractor Furnished Material (CFM) to be made 
available for Government purchase. 
o Format and configuration of technical and other Program data to be 
returned during Phase III. 
o Residual value of Government facilities resulting from Contractor 
improvements to be returned during Phase III. 
 Return the Rotable Pool Equipment to the Government in RFI condition.   
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 Establish with the Government, a joint Exit Transition Integrated Process 
Team (IPT) to develop the schedule and milestones for an orderly transition of 
APU TLS to Government control.  
 Deliver a proposal for procurement of all equipment repair piece parts 
required at all levels of maintenance.  (SOW, 2000) 
 
In summary, this chapter presented data specific to the Honeywell APU TLS PBL 
Contract, which will be analyzed in Chapter IV.  The data presented included PBFR, 
Performance Metrics (availability and reliability), incentives, the gain share clause, and 
exit provisions.  Additional data that was presented consisted of the actions, activities and 






























This chapter provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data presented 
in Chapter III.  This chapter seeks to determine if the contractual terms and conditions 
established were effective in facilitating the full potential of PBL savings and improved 
performance.  In this chapter, we will analyze the metrics and incentives of the 
Honeywell TLS contract for their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes.  
Additionally, we will appraise the methods used in attaining the goals of PBL and 
provide information concerning the observed effects from the methods used.  Lastly, we 
will provide alternative methods and measures, as appropriate. 
A. AVAILABLE DATA 
All aircraft types covered under this contract have been in operation for a 
significant period of time with associated operational and maintenance data readily 
available through NAVAIR’s information systems such as the Naval Aviation Logistics 
Data Analysis (NALDA) database. Adequate data was available for establishing a 
meaningful baseline for ensuring the contract arrangements are cost effective. 
B. CONTRACT 
  The ten-year requirements contract is an award-term arrangement and with 
successful performance, the contractor will be awarded five one-year additional periods.  
The contractor’s incentive in meeting the availability and reliability performance metrics 
is to gain the award of the additional five one-year ordering periods.  Basically, the 
contractor must meet the performance metrics to stay on contract.  The award-term 
arrangement reduces the contractor’s uncertainty and risk, because he knows that 
successful performance will lead to a longer-term contract.  The longer-term contract 
allows the contractor to make investments in improving performance, reducing costs and 
recouping his initial outflows.  On the other hand, shorter award-term arrangements, such 
as three base years and two one-year additional periods, may not allow the contractor 
enough time to complete the required investments in reliability and recover his initial 
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losses.  Additionally, the shorter period may not provide adequate compensation for the 
contractor assuming the huge risks associated with PBL.  
In addition to the award-term arrangement, the contract provides for availability 
and reliability improvements over the life of the contract at a fixed price.  The contract 
does not provide incentives for the contractor to provide greater availability above what 
is called for in the contract, but does provide penalties for availability rates below 90%.  
Additionally, there are no specific award fees or incentives tied to reliability 
improvements, but there are penalties for not meeting the APU Reliability Improvement 
Schedule.  Basically, the contract buys availability and reliability improvements at a fixed 
price.  According to DoD (2001) “incentives should be positive, but balanced”.  With this 
contract, the only positive incentive is the award-term arrangement.  The negative 
incentives reduce the contractor’s profit and ability to implement further reliability 
improvements causing a graveyard spiral, resulting in bad contract performance, 
contractor losses and unwillingness to accept the risks associated with PBL. 
1. Price by Flight Hour Rates (PBFR) 
Using PBFR to determine contract worth and basis of performance indicates that 
flight hours are important in explaining and forecasting APU unscheduled removals 
(MFHBUR).  As shown in Appendix F, the covariance and coefficient of correlation 
between aircraft flight hours and the number of APU unscheduled removals indicates 
there is a weak positive linear relationship between aircraft flight hours and APU 
removals, except for the C-2, which demonstrates almost no correlation.  In other words, 
as flight hours increase (slightly decrease for the C-2) so do the number of APU 
removals, but from the results of a regression analysis, the coefficient of determination 
(R2) ranges from 0.0024 to 0.289.  This means, at most, only 28.9% of the variation in 
APU unscheduled removals is accounted for by a linear relationship explained by flight 
hours.  Additionally, the standard error to the average number of APU removals ranges 
from 27% to 93%, which indicates significant error between the actual value and the 
predicted value.  Lastly, in testing the coefficient significance (flight hours) of the linear 
regression model, the null hypothesis is that the flight hour coefficient is not significant.  
In other words, flight hours do not affect the number of APU unscheduled removals.  On 
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the FA-18, S-3 and C-2, the P-values are not significant at any level and the t-statistic is 
within the rejection region, which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
Therefore, flight hours are not a good indicator of APU removals.  For the P-3, the P-
value is significant and the t-statistic is not in the rejection region, but with a standard 
error of 35% and a R2 of 29%, flight hours are not the best indicator for P-3 APU 
unscheduled removals.  
With the above, there is little or no relationship between aircraft flight hours and 
APU reliability and MFHBUR.  Individual aircraft flights, an indicator of aircraft starts, 
provide similar results.  The results infer that APU reliability has little impact on flight 
hours; therefore, MFHBUR is not an appropriate metric for TLS contract pricing and 
measuring APU reliability.   
 The results are validated after reviewing APU operations.  The APU is rarely 
used in flight.  The APU is primarily used for starting the aircraft engines before flight 
and for conducting ground maintenance.  Aircraft flight hours do not account for the 
APU operational hours used during ground maintenance.  As an example, the APU on the 
FA-18 and C-2 is used mainly for aircraft engine starts before flight or ground engine 
runs.  The FA-18 APU operational use is generally three minutes for starting both 
engines as compared to an average 1.4 flight hours per flight, hence the R2 of 0.0159.  
For the S-3, maintenance procedures require lengthy ground APU runs in addition to 
aircraft engine starts before flight.  Therefore, the S-3 R2 is higher than the FA-18 and C-
2 R2, but still a low value at 0.0482.  A further validation of the above results is the 
contractor pursuing the installation of hour meters, start counters and or data memory 
buttons on the APU to accurately measure APU operational hours. . 
An alternative to the PBFR contract pricing method follows.  As stated, 
MFHBUR is not a good metric for measuring APU reliability.  MFHBURs is used in the 
below calculations, because those are the values that are currently recorded.  In 
establishing other PBL contracts for the APU or similar components, mean APU 
operational hours (minutes) between unscheduled removals or similar APU specific 
measure should be used. 
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For the C-2, the estimated average contract price is $888,500 with the assumption 
that the contract was properly valued at least including transaction fees, contract 
maintenance costs, risk, transportation requirements, spare parts inventory, storage, and 
Depot repairs.  With the above assumption, we can demonstrate various price levels 
based on reliability improvements.  For this demonstration, we will use only Depot 
repairs, but with improved reliability, cost for transportation, spare parts inventory, and 
storage would decrease.   
To calculate the contract cost per MFHBUR and the estimated Depot repair costs, 
the average annual flight hours for the C-2 are approximately 8,700 flight hours and the 
baseline MFHBURs is 443 flight hours.  The estimated contract cost of $888,500 equates 
to $2,005 per MFHBUR.  Dividing the flight hours flown by the MFHBUR provides the 
expected number of depot repairs.  In this case, the baseline expected depot repairs is 
twenty repairs per year.  With a Depot repair price of $27,530, the twenty repairs equates 
to an annual cost of $550,600   The desired reliability improvement is 30% above the 
baseline, which equates to a MFHBUR of 576 flight hours.  This improvement results in 
an expected fifteen annual depot repairs, which equates to a cost of $412,950 and a cost 
avoidance of $137,650.  The new contract price at the desired reliability improvement 
would be $750,850 or $1,304 per MFHBUR.  To achieve the desired reliability, by acting 
on the contractor’s profit motive, the contract should be priced at or above the desired 
reliability improvement.  In this case, the contract would be priced at or below $1,304 per 
MFHBUR.  At this price level, the contractor would be motivated to decrease his current 
costs ($2,005 per MFHBUR) to the contract price (future costs) ($1,304 per MFHBUR) 
or below through reliability, supply chain and or process improvements. The contractor 
would break even and the government would achieve the desired reliability when the 
contractor reduces his costs (transportation requirements, spare parts inventory, storage, 
and Depot repairs) to $1,304 per MFHBUR or less.  Any additional improvements by the 
contractor would lead to contractor profits and greater performance for the government.   
With the above method, the true definition of PBL is achieved.  Coupled with a 
long duration award term agreement, the contractor has the security and incentive to 
improve reliability and other processes to reduce his costs and generate a profit as soon as 
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possible.  Under this PBL arrangement, the contractor would be empowered to optimize 
system readiness and product support effectiveness to meet the specified performance 
metrics.  If the contractor is unable to deliver reliability improvements, then the 
government still gains by paying less for logistics support than before the contract due to 
the negotiated lower price of the contract.  The alternative pricing method provides 
incentives and empowerment to the contractor where the government gains the desired 
weapon system performance and the contractor is allowed his profits. 
2. Performance Metrics 
a. Availability 
Availability as defined by the SOW (2000) equates to fill rate or parts 
availability, which, as defined by DoD (2004) and NAVAIR (2004b), is a logistics 
response time metric and not operational or inherent availability (Ao and Ai, 
respectively).  Fill rate is a process measurement where an operational decision depends 
on that process information and is important, but this metric indicates that the APU mean 
time between maintenance (MTBM) and mean maintenance down time (MDT), elements 
of Ao, can be any value as long as the contractor can provide (90% of the time) a 
replacement APU within the specified timeframes.  On the other hand, under PBL, 
contracting for Ao can provide significant improvements in weapon system performance.   
Ao is defined as: “the probability that a system or equipment, when used 
under stated conditions in an actual operational environment will operate satisfactorily 
when called upon (Blanchard, 1998).  The formula for Ao is MTBM divided by the sum 
of MTBM and MDT (Blanchard, 1998).  This formula shows the dynamic relationship 
between MTBM and MDT.  Increasing the time between maintenance and reducing the 
maintenance down time can improve Ao.  MDT includes active maintenance time, and 
logistics and administrative delay time.  In contrast, fill rate includes logistics and 
administrative delay time, but does not include active maintenance time or MTBM.   
Using Ao as a performance metric and with proper incentives, the 
contractor would be influenced to increase the APU’s MTBM and reduce MDT.  
Conversely, by using fill rate as a performance metric, the contractor could be motivated 
to improve supply chain effectiveness, specifically transportation and distribution, rather 
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than weapon system performance.  To demonstrate this, the number of APU 
cannibalizations can be an indicator of supply chain effectiveness.  If the numbers of 
cannibalizations decrease, then generally APUs are available for issue when required.  
With the inception of this contract, the number of cannibalizations shows a decreasing 
trend indicating improved supply chain effectiveness and parts availability. 
The improved parts availability can also be attributed to the availability 
adjustment (penalty) for not meeting the contract requirement of 90% availability.  “The 
availability adjustment was derived by dividing a total dollar amount by the number of 
percentage points to allocate the money over” (G. D. Tonoff, personal communication, 
August 26, 2005).  The availability adjustment was not scientifically derived and may 
lead to excessive contractor penalties.  The availability adjustment is provided for in 
increments of $20,000 per percentage point below 90%, but based on simple division; the 
availability percentage for the C-2 would be reduced by 4% per APU not delivered on 
time.  Based on delivery records for FY04, twenty-five C-2 APUs were supplied to the 
war fighter.  Using FY04 as the base year, shipping twenty-five APUs is 100% 
availability, while delivering twenty-four out of twenty-five equates to 96%, hence the 
4% reduction per APU not delivered on time.  Delivering one less APU, with average 
annual requisitions of twenty-five, represents a 4% change in availability.  In this case, at 
twenty-two APUs (88% availability) the contractor would be penalized two percentage 
points ($40,000) and at twenty-one APUs (82%) the contractor would be penalized six 
percentage points ($120,000), based solely on the total number of requisitions 
(denominator).  This excessive penalty appears to be an unintended consequence of not 
using rigorous methods to value penalties.  Alternative methods are to penalize the 
contractor for each component not delivered within the specified timeframes, or 
preferably provide incentives to decrease logistics response time.  The disincentive 
should cost the same or more than the cost of the service provided.  From a basic online 
Federal Express rate quote, to ship a C-2 APU from the west coast to the east coast of the 
United States would generally cost from $1,700 to $2,300.  So, the disincentive should be 
valued at or greater than $2,300 per APU not delivered within the required timeframe.  
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The preferred method would be to provide a monetary incentive for decreasing logistics 
delay time. 
b. Reliability 
As discussed in the analysis of PBFR, aircraft flight hours have little 
impact on APU reliability.  MFHBUR, as defined in the contract, is therefore, an 
inappropriate measure of effectiveness for this application of PBL. 
Additionally, the contractor has little or no control over unscheduled 
removals due to the APU not operating properly.  The contractor would have to be 
involved with and influence government maintenance decisions such as O-level APU 
removal and I-level Beyond Capability Maintenance (BCM) actions.  The number of 
BCM actions has increased dramatically, because of the transfer of first-degree and 
second-degree repair capability to the Depot and misinterpreting the TLS Contract as a 
warranty.  All of the above increases the contractor’s costs, motivating the contractor to 
provide training and troubleshooting to keep the APU installed.  Additionally, 
maintenance processes can change.  As in the case of the S-3, the aircraft inspection 
process was changed, requiring longer APU ground runs. 
For reliability guarantees, the specified reliability improvement targets 
may be unrealistic.  According to IG (2000), “the P-3 LECP would cost eight million 
dollars and require at least five years to deliver, install, and realize the reliability 
improvements”.  The TLS contract calls for a 300% improvement in the P-3 APU 
reliability in only two years.  This effort would require significant resources to 
accomplish such an improvement in so short of a time.  As of Sep 2004 (over three years 
under the TLS contract), the P-3 has experienced only a 9% to 17% increase in 
MFHBURs.      
For the reliability adjustment, the amount appears to be simple division, a 
total dollar amount allocated over the four aircraft with the C-2 receiving proportionately 
less.  The amount of the adjustment in comparison to the contract value ranges from 1.5% 
to 4.5% and maybe insignificant as a disincentive.  Additionally, the P-3 LECP was 
estimated to cost $8 million dollars, whereas the penalty for not meeting the reliability 
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guarantee is only $75,000.  The contractor may be motivated to assume the least cost and 
may choose to not implement the reliability improvements.  Additionally, the drafters of 
the contract “chose to put most of the money against delivery response time (availability) 
vice reliability as PBFR inherently incentives reliability” (G. D. Tonoff, personal 
communication, August 26, 2005).  As discussed above, PBFR is not a good metric for 
providing incentives to APU reliability.   
Figure 4.   Contractor’s PBL Cash Flow.  (Kotlanger & Giuntini, 2004) 
 
3. Gain Share 
According to Kotlanger and Giuntini (2004), “a contractor with a PBL focus will 
place an emphasis on reducing the time required to make a profit”.  Additionally, 
Kotlanger and Giuntini (2004) stated that: “PBL offerings require large upfront 
investments (parts inventory, facilities, test equipment, etc.), with revenues often 
significantly trailing those expenditures.  The contractor must attack these PBL outflows 
to make positive cash flow as soon as possible” (Kotlanger & Giuntini, 2004).  Figure 4 
demonstrates the contractor’s time-to-profit emphasis discussed above.  The graph does 
not use actual cost data and only identifies that losses can occur in the beginning of a 
PBL contract.  The duration of the losses depends upon, among other things, the 
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contractor’s financial status, ability to manage cash flow, cost of required improvements 
and amount of cash inflow. 
As defined in the contract, starting in year three of Phase II, the contractor is 
monetarily penalized for realizing reliability improvements greater than 25% above the 
guaranteed minimum improvement identified for each aircraft platform.  According to 
Tonoff, “the gain share percentage of 25% was unscientific, but we recognized sharing 
from the first percentage or dollar of improvement wasn’t logical.  We allowed 25% 
improvement without sharing to encourage (reliability) investments” (G. D. Tonoff, 
personal communication, August 26, 2005).  With this clause, the contractor has only two 
years to implement significant reliability and other logistics improvements without 
incurring the gain share clause.  These tasks may be difficult given the initial capital 
investments of buying parts inventory and establishing the required logistics 
infrastructure. The gain share clause can be incurred when the contractor needs the cash 
most to recover from the initial capital investments.  This penalty can restrict the 
contractor in actively reducing costs and achieving efficient and effective operations.     
The above is demonstrated by gain share calculations and a basic cost to benefit 
comparison shown in Tables 5 and 6.  Using the gain share formula described by Figure 
2, Tables 5 and 6 identify the number of depot repairs and the Depot Repair Costs 
avoided with increasing reliability improvements.  A Depot Repair Price of $27,530 (C-2 
actual repair price) and an estimated shipping cost of $2,300 per APU shipped were used  
Table 5.   Gain Share Calculations 
Baseline Repairs 24.9 11029 Actual FH 
    443 Baseline MFHBUR 
Reliability Guarantee 23.1 478 8% Improvement in MFHBUR 
 1.8Depot Repairs Avoided ($50,186) 
  21.4 515 16% improvement in MFHBUR 
 3.5Depot Repairs Avoided ($95,822) 
  20.1 549 24% improvement in MFHBUR 
 4.8Depot Repairs Avoided ($132,656) 
  18.7 589 33% Improvement in MFHBUR 
  6.2     
 $170,060Depot Cost Avoided at 28% improvement














to complete these calculations.  Using the 8%, 16%, 24% and 33% reliability 
improvement numbers, a basic cost to benefit comparison was made.  The ECP cost for 
each comparison was adjusted so that the costs would equal the benefits.  As shown in 
Table 6, the benefits of an 8% improvement in reliability include a shipping and repair 
cost avoidance of $54,378, which means the contractor can spend up to that amount on an 
ECP before incurring costs greater than the benefits.  As shown in Table 6, the benefits 
and the funds available to conduct an engineering change increase as the percentage of 
improvement increases, except after the government’s limitation of 25% above the 
guaranteed minimum improvement.  At 33% (reliability guarantee plus 25%), the 
benefits are cost avoidances of $184,267, but the contractor incurs the gain share cost of 
$85,030, leaving only $99,237 for reliability improvements.  At 33% improvement, the 
contractor will incur more costs than benefits and may be inclined to delay increasing the 
APU’s performance.  As defined in the contract, the gain share clause provides penalties 
rather than incentives and capped revenue at a critical time, which can delay improving 
the APU’s reliability. 
Table 6.   Cost Benefit Comparison 
Reliability Guarantee (8%) 16% Reliability Improvement 
Costs Costs 
ECP Cost $54,378 ECP Cost $103,827 
Gov Adj $0 Gov Adj $0 
  $54,378   $103,827 
Benefits Benefits 
Repair Avoidance $50,186 Repair Avoidance $95,822 
Shipping Avoidance $4,193Shipping Avoidance $8,005 
  $54,378   $103,827 
24% Reliability Improvement 33% Reliability Improvement 
Costs  Costs 
ECP Cost $143,789 ECP Cost $99,237 
Gov Adj $0 Gov Adj $85,030 
  $143,789   $184,267 
Benefits  Benefits  
Repair Avoidance $132,656 Repair Avoidance $170,060 
Shipping Avoidance $11,083Shipping Avoidance $14,208 
  $143,789   $184,267 
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In addition to delaying reliability improvements, the gain share clause goes 
against the true definition of PBL where the contractor is allowed to maximize his profits 
by decreasing his costs through reliability improvements, supply chain efficiencies and 
other measures.    Further, the contractor gain shares with the government by providing 
greater reliability (performance), while charging the government at a lower rate (i.e., 92% 
reliability at a rate for 90%).  The government is risk adverse and is concerned that the 
contractor will gain too much profit or, in other words, the government will pay too 
much.  To fully achieve the benefits of PBL, this mindset needs to change and recognize 
the contractor’s profit motive.  “The contractor’s revenue does not have to increase, but 
there has to be a material improvement in profit through reliability improvements and 
reduced costs” (Kotlanger & Giuntini, 2005).  Figure 4 indicates the contractor is making 
huge profits in the out-years, but the contractor’s total profit should be equal to or greater 
than his losses.  By allowing the contractor his profits, the government gains through 
improved weapon system performance and reduced operating costs. 
C. COMPRESS THE SUPPLY THE CHAIN 
There is no apparent compression of the DLR supply chain.  The APU TLS 
contract with Honeywell features new supplier relationships and configurations, but the 
net result appears to be the addition of parallel processes and inventory.  As shown in 
Appendix B, with the transfer of management of consumables in support of APU repairs, 
Honeywell duplicates some of DLA’s functions.  Additionally, the SOW (2000) requires 
Honeywell to ship RFI assets to the war fighter, which duplicates some of the duties of 
the DDD.  With DLA no longer being the primary supplier of NADEP CP’s APU 
consumables, the result is two parallel and duplicate inventories.  These duplicate 
inventories and functions increase the complexity of the DLR supply chain and lead to 
cost inefficiencies, reduce the benefits of stock consolidation, and increase overhead 
costs. 
D. ELIMINATE NON-VALUE ADDED STEPS 
The indicators provided certainly suggest that non-value added steps were 
eliminated, but both parties, NADEP CP and Honeywell, implemented several initiatives 
before and during the period of the TLS contract that could have been responsible for the  
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Figure 5.   Aircraft Annual Maintenance Costs (FY99 dollars) 
 
improvements in the process.  Honeywell’s initiatives under this contract did contribute 
to process improvements and the elimination of non-value added steps. 
E. MAINTENANCE COST ELEMENTS 
As shown in Figure 5, during FY01, all aircraft experienced a decrease in 
maintenance costs, except for the C-2.  C-2 costs remained relatively the same from 
FY99 to FY04.  From FY02 to FY04, all aircraft incurred greater costs as compared to 
FY01, except as noted for the C-2.  Total costs increased for FY02, FY03, and FY04, 
because of the increased contract costs due to the increased flight hours associated with 
Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  The greater flight hours 
indicates a higher level of maintenance actions and greater overall costs.  Overall, during 
the indicated period, C-2 costs remained the same; F-18 costs are less than original costs; 
and P-3 and S-3 costs increased. 
For the C-2, costs remained relatively the same from FY99 to FY04.  AVDLR 
and Depot costs increased, while AFM and DMMH costs decreased.  The increase in 
AVDLR and Depot costs can be attributed to an increase in the number of BCMs with an 
associated decrease in the use of consumable items at the I-level due to transferring first 
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and second degree repair to the Depot.  Additionally, during FY01 and FY02, the C-2’s 
flight hours were increased as compared to FY00.  During FY02, FY03 and FY04, nearly 
all APU maintenance actions at the I-level resulted in BCMs.  Additionally, there has not 
been any apparent increase in the reliability of the C-2 APU.   The bottom line for the C-
2 is that average yearly costs after the APU TLS contract have increased 16% as 
compared to the average yearly costs prior to the contract.  The increase in average yearly 
costs can be attributed to increased flight hours during FY01 and FY02, a nearly doubled 
BCM rate and no reliability improvements. 
For the FA-18, total costs decreased during FY01, but then increased over the 
next three years.  AVDLR costs decreased during FY01, due to the change in Net Price, 
although there was an increase in items processed.  AVDLR costs during FY02, FY03 
and FY04 increased because of greater usage (OEF/OIF operations), which created 
higher contract costs than AVDLR charges.  Additionally, there was relatively no change 
in AFM, DMMH or Depot repair costs, except during FY02 and FY03 when a greater 
level of flight hours was incurred.  The bottom line for the FA-18 is that average yearly 
costs after the APU TLS contract have decreased by 31% as compared to the average 
yearly costs prior to the contract.  The decrease in average yearly costs can be attributed 
mainly to the decrease in the APU’s Net Price.  FA-18 APU removals have not decreased 
(no reliability improvements) and the BCM rate has not increased similar to other 
aircraft. 
For the P-3, total costs slightly decreased during FY01, increased during FY02, 
decreased during FY03, while remaining flat for FY04.  Overall, AFM costs have 
significantly decreased, while Depot costs have increased 100% or more.  AVDLR and 
DMMH costs have relatively remained the same.  The increase in depot costs is not 
accounted for by the P-3 BCM rate, which only increased by 3%.  Based on the data 
collected, the exact reason for Depot costs to increase is difficult to identify, but may be 
attributed to the age of the aircraft, and design limitations in reliability and 
maintainability.  The slight decrease in costs during FY01 can be attributed to the P-3 
having the lowest reduction in Net Price offset by a slight increase in flight hours.  
During FY02, FY03, and FY04, the P-3 experienced an increase in flight hours overall 
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and specifically, per airframe.  In other words, each aircraft is flying more hours, which 
leads to greater costs.  The decrease in costs from FY02 to FY03 and FY04 can be 
attributed to the achieved reliability improvements resulting in a decrease in the number 
of APU removals.  The bottom line for the P-3 is that average yearly costs after the APU 
TLS contract have increased 18% as compared to the average yearly costs prior to the 
contract.  The increase in average yearly costs can be attributed mainly to the doubling of 
Depot repair costs. 
For the S-3, total costs decreased during FY01, but then increased during FY02, 
FY03 and FY04.  Total costs during FY01 decreased mainly because of the significant 
decrease in APU net price.  AVDLR costs during FY01 decreased significantly with the 
significant decrease in APU net price.  Total costs increased for FY02 and FY03, because 
of the increased contract costs associated with increased flight hours during OEF and 
OIF.  AFM costs decreased tremendously throughout the period, while AVDLR and 
Depot Repair costs increased due to increased BCMs and flight hours during OEF and 
OIF.  Contract costs exceeded AVDLR costs during OEF and OIF due to PBFR.  DMMH 
costs increased dramatically during FY02 indicating the increased workload supporting 
the S-3 in a deployed environment and the lack of reliability improvements.  During 
FY03 and FY04, DMMH decreased approaching normal levels.  The bottom line for the 
S-3 is that average yearly costs after the APU TLS contract have increased 19% as 
compared to the average yearly costs prior to the contract.  The increase in average yearly 
costs can be attributed mainly to the increased contract costs during OEF and OIF, an 
increase in BCMs (97% BCM Rate during FY04) and associated AVDLR and Depot 
Repair Costs.   
F. APU PERFORMANCE 
1. Availability 
Parts availability has increased with Average Delivery Time reduced from 35 
days to 5.4 days, 98% requisitions filled and supply material availability from 65% to 
95% (Sara & Garvey, 2004), but IG (2000) “contends that FY 1999 availability for the 
majority of the repairable items was 90% or better, with the four APUs being 87% 
available”.  Additionally, “Honeywell manufactures the additional part that has caused 
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the delays in repairs of five items with low availability” (IG, 2000).  IG (2000) 
questioned “how Honeywell can improve their production schedule to meet TLS contract 
demands while they were not improved to meet DLA demands”.  According to Tonoff 
(2000);  
DLA’s practice is to order material from Honeywell at manufacturing lead time 
and with a DLA administrative lead time of more than 180 days large quantity 
orders are placed for several years worth of demand.  This practice often results in 
significant backorders for the material at the time of the order.  Under TLS, 
Honeywell will place small quantity orders at production lead time at a demand 
equal to actual consumption plus safety stock to meet demand surges.  Delivery 
will be just in time at a rate that is well within production capacity (Tonoff, 2000). 
 
2. Reliability 
As discussed in the analysis of Price by Flight Hour Rates, flight hours are not a 
good metric for determining APU reliability.  As shown in Appendix E, the P-3 reliability 
has improved.  The FA-18, C-2 and S-3 reliability has generally remained the same or not 
improved.  
G. LOGISTICS FOOTPRINT 
1. Reliability Improvements and Cannibalizations 
Improving reliability increases the probability that the APU will continue to 
operate over a longer period of time.  Greater reliability, along with decreased 
cannibalizations, means a smaller logistics footprint, including time and money required, 
fewer people, less maintenance actions and reduced inventory and spares.  
Cannibalizations have decreased, because of increased availability of spares, but only one 
aircraft has demonstrated reliability improvements.  The MFHBUR for the other aircraft 
have not improved, indicating that the same or more removals are still being conducted; 
therefore, no reduction in footprint.  
2. Staffing Levels, Inventory and Equipment Needs, and Facilities  
As discussed, the change to the maintenance plan transfers first-degree and 
second-degree repair from the I-level to the D-level.  The implication of a reduction in 
repair capability is the potential for reduction in staffing levels, inventory and equipment 
needs, and facilities at the I-level, but the savings may not be realized.  
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For staffing levels, a Power Plants Mechanic is responsible for maintaining both 
the aircraft engine and the APU.  With this arrangement, there would be a reduction in 
workload, but not necessarily staffing at the war fighter level.  At the upper levels of 
staffing, IG (2000) indicates that there is no evidence of eliminating any layers of 
management, and appears that there are actually additional layers of management.  The 
additional layers of management include the dedicated PCO and WSM, and the 
establishment of the CSB for this contract.  The PCO and WSM are in addition to 
existing PMs and the CSB is in addition to all the other boards and meetings that 
encompasses a PM’s day.   
Table 7.   Equipment Reduction Percentages 
Category Equipment 
P-3 Shop Equipment 72% 
P-3 Test Cell 41% 
C-2 Shop Equipment 48% 
C-2 Test Cell 5% 
S-3 Shop Equipment 42% 
S-3 Land based Test Cell 10% 
S-3 Shipboard Test Cell 0% 
FA-18 Shop Equipment 20% 
FA-18 Land based Test Cell 0% 
FA-18 Shipboard Test Cell 0% 
For inventory and equipment needs, additional tools, test equipment, and 
maintenance fixtures and stands are required to conduct first-degree and second-degree 
maintenance over third-degree repairs. By eliminating first-degree and second-degree 
repair at the I-level, the potential for reduction in assets is shown in Table 7.   The 
equipment reduction percentages were calculated by counting the total equipment 
required for I-level repair capability.  Dividing the first-degree and second-degree repair 
equipment by the total equipment furnished the percentage of equipment reduction.  The 
list of tools required for APU repair actions is reduced an average 24%, but sometimes 
the gear is not transferred out of the unit or is used for other maintenance actions 
resulting in limited reduction of logistics footprint. 
For facilities, third-degree repair entails test and check operations requiring test 
cells and other equipment.  Therefore, hangar bays, work centers and test cells remain in 
support of APU third-degree repair actions and other type model series engines and 
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aircraft.  There can be a savings in facilities, but these freed up assets (work centers, test 
cells, etc.) would be quickly absorbed into other maintenance operations negating any 
savings.  
3. Training 
TECOM (2002) and NAVPERS (2004) not being updated is an indication that 
training at an MOS/NEC granting school has also not been updated, providing no 
apparent reduction in training requirements.  Additional training by the contractor is 
allowed by the SOW (2000) and is implied by the contractor’s motivation to conduct the 
informal field maintenance and operations training to reduce unwarranted removals at the 
O-level and increase repairs at the I-level.  Reducing removals at the O-level increases 
the APU’s time on wing and apparent MFHBUR, while increasing repairs at the I-level 
decreases BCM actions and reduces the contractor’s cost in D-level repairs.  The 
contractor’s FSE add to the list of contractor representatives already crowding the hangar 
decks and maintenance facilities. 
4. Publications 
The Program Offices, in conjunction with NATEC, are still responsible for 
maintaining, printing, distributing, and updating technical publications for other aircraft 
systems and the O-level portion of the APU system; therefore, only marginal savings in 
logistics footprint have been achieved in this area. 
5. Transportation Assets 
The government is responsible for NRFI shipments, while the contractor is 
responsible for RFI shipments. Government transportation assets are still required 
providing only a minimal reduction in footprint. 
H. EXIT PROVISIONS 
Exit Provisions are adequate and mitigate long-term risk by facilitating the re-
establishment of organic or commercial support capability. 
In summary, this chapter provided a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
data presented in Chapter III.  The analysis included determining the effectiveness of the  
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metrics and incentives of the Honeywell TLS contract and an appraisal of the methods 
used in attaining the goals of PBL.  Lastly, alternative methods and measures were 
provided, as appropriate. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, the findings of our research will be summarized.  
Recommendations specific to the Honeywell APU TLS PBL contract and PBL 
applications in general will be provided. 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
1. Contract 
The contract meets best commercial practices by applying PBL at the component 
level where appropriate system performance data was available to establish cost effective 
contract arrangements. 
The contract is not a true PBL application in that the contract buys availability 
and reliability improvements at a fixed price with required improvement schedules.  The 
contract does not provide positive incentives for the contractor to provide greater 
reliability, but rather specific reliability improvement deliverables.  Penalties are assessed 
for not meeting the APU Reliability Improvement Schedule and availability rates below 
90%.      
The most important incentive of this contract is the ten-year award term 
arrangement.  The ten-year award term arrangement reduces the contractor’s uncertainty 
and risk, because he knows that successful performance will lead to a longer-term 
contract.  The longer-term contract allows the contractor to make investments in 
improving performance, reducing costs and recouping his initial outflows.  On the other 
hand, shorter award-term arrangements, such as three base years and two one-year 
additional periods, may not allow the contractor enough time to complete the required 
investments in reliability and recover his initial investments. 
a. Price by Flight Hours (PBFR) 
Flight hours have little impact on APU reliability; therefore, PBFR and 
MFHBUR is not an appropriate metric for TLS contract pricing and measuring APU 
reliability.  In a simple linear regression analysis, the model involving flight hours as an 
indicator of APU unscheduled removals was found to be invalid.  At most, only 28.9% of 
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the variation (R2) in APU unscheduled removals is explained by flight hours.  The results 
were validated, because the APU is rarely used in flight.  The APU is primarily used for 
starting the aircraft engines before flight and for conducting ground maintenance.  
Aircraft flight hours do not account for the APU operational hours used during ground 
maintenance.  Aircraft flight hours are not a good indicator of APU removals and for 
tracking reliability improvements.   
With the operation of the APU being independent of flight hours, the APU 
could be considered a weapon system in itself, with its own subcomponents and metrics 
including availability (Ao), reliability, Cost per Usage, logistics footprint and logistics 
response time.  The APU is an ideal candidate for the contractor to be solely responsible 
for the operational availability of the APU.   
The alternative pricing method discussed, achieves the true definition of 
PBL.  The alternative pricing method sets the contract price at the desired reliability 
improvement by accounting for reduced Depot repairs, transportation, spares inventory, 
and storage requirements.  Under this pricing method, the contractor would be 
empowered to optimize system readiness and product support effectiveness to meet the 
specified performance metrics.  Coupled with a long duration award term agreement, the 
contractor has the security and incentive to improve reliability and other processes to 
reduce his costs and generate a profit as soon as possible.    If the contractor is unable to 
deliver reliability improvements, then the government still gains by paying less for 
logistics support than before the contract due to the negotiated lower price of the contract.  
The alternative pricing method provides incentives, empowerment and profits to the 
contractor and the government gains the desired weapon system performance and cost 
savings. 
b. Availability 
Availability as defined by the SOW (2000) equates to a Logistics 
Response Time (LRT) metric, and is an important metric in that an operational decision 
depends on that process information.  The problem with this metric by itself is that 
MTBM and MDT of the APU can be any value as long as the contractor can provide 
(90% of the time) a replacement APU within the specified timeframes.  On the other 
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hand, significant improvements in weapon system performance can be obtained by 
contracting for Ao and LRT.  With proper incentives, the contractor would be motivated 
to increase the APU’s MTBM and reduce MDT, which leads to the reduction of parts 
requisitions, inventory, cycle time and overall costs. 
The availability adjustment was apparently not analytically determined 
and can result in excessive penalties.  The availability adjustment is provided for in 
increments of $20,000 per percentage point below 90%, but based on simple division and 
using FY04 data; the availability percentage for the C-2 would be reduced by 4% per 
APU not delivered on time.  In this case, at twenty-two APUs (88% availability) the 
contractor would be penalized two percentage points ($40,000) versus a shipping cost of 
only $2,300.  Alternative methods are to penalize the contractor for each component not 
delivered within the specified timeframes, or preferably provide incentives to decrease 
logistics response time.  
c. Reliability 
APU reliability (MFHBUR) is independent of Aircraft flight hours; 
therefore, an inappropriate measure of effectiveness for tracking reliability 
improvements.  Additionally the contractor has little or no control over unscheduled 
removals, which can result in unwarranted removals, reduced MFHBUR, and contractor 
incurred penalties. 
The contract reliability guarantees are unrealistic.  IG (2000) stated that 
the P-3 LECP would require up to five years to deliver components and realize the 
benefits.  “The P-3 LECP is based on upgrading 175, 95-3 and 35, 95-2 P-3 APUs to a 
95-10 configuration” (IG, 2000).  Under the TLS contract, the specified reliability 
improvement target for the P-3 is 300% improvement in two years, with actual 
improvements only being 9% to 17% in over three years. 
The reliability adjustment was apparently not analytically determined and 
may be insignificant when compared to the value of the contract, and costs required for 
reliability improvements.  The contractor may be motivated to assume the least cost and 
may choose not to implement the reliability improvements. 
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d. Gain Share Clause 
The Gain Share Clause is an attempt at sharing the benefits gained, but the 
timing is poor and goes against the true definition of PBL.  The true definition of PBL 
allows the contractor to maximize his profits by decreasing his costs through reliability 
improvements, supply chain efficiencies and other measures.  Further, the contractor gain 
shares with the government by providing greater reliability (performance), while 
charging the government at a lower rate (i.e., 92% reliability at a rate for 90%).  The gain 
share clause, as written, can be incurred when the contractor needs the cash most to 
recover from the initial capital investments in purchasing inventory and equipment, and 
conducting reliability improvements.  As defined in the contract, the gain share clause 
provides penalties rather than incentives and capped revenue at a critical time, which can 
delay improving the APU’s reliability.  By allowing the contractor his profits, the 
government gains through improved weapon system performance and reduced operating 
costs. 
2. Compress the Supply Chain 
There is no apparent compression of the DLR supply chain.  The APU TLS 
contract with Honeywell features new supplier relationships and configurations, but the 
net result appears to be the addition of parallel processes and duplicate inventories.  
Honeywell conducts the same DLA functions with the transfer and management of APU 
specific consumables to Honeywell.  Honeywell via CatLog also performs the duties of 
the DDD with storing and shipping APU components.  DLA and DDD still exist and 
provide for other DoD customers.  These parallel processes and duplicate inventories 
increase the complexity of the DLR supply chain and lead to cost inefficiencies, reduce 
the benefits of stock consolidation, and increase overhead costs. 
3. Eliminate Non-value Added Steps 
Non-value added steps were eliminated, but both parties, NADEP CP and 
Honeywell, implemented several initiatives before and during the period of the TLS 
contract that could have been responsible for the improvements in the process. 
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4. Maintenance Cost Elements (in 1999 dollars) 
Overall, during the FY99 to FY04 period, C-2 costs remained the same; F-18 
costs are less than original costs; and P-3 and S-3 costs increased.  Significant events that 
impacted costs included the drop in the AVDLR Net Price during FY01 and surge 
operations associated with Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
during FY02, FY03, and FY04.  The greater flight hours during OEF and OIF generated 
higher contract costs due to PBFR and more maintenance actions; therefore, greater 
overall costs.  Another significant event was the changes to the maintenance plan, which 
transferred first-degree and second-degree repair capability to the D-level.  This change 
caused AVDLR and Depot costs to rise, and AFM and DMMH costs to fall, due to an 
increasing BCM rate at the I-level.  
The bottom line for individual aircraft follows: 
• C-2 average yearly costs were up 16% due to greater flight hours during 
FY01 and FY02, a nearly doubled BCM rate and no reliability improvements. 
• FA-18 average yearly costs declined 31% due to the decrease in the 
APU’s Net Price.  FA-18 APU removals have not diminished (no reliability 
improvements) and the BCM rate has not risen similar to other aircraft. 
• P-3 average yearly costs rose 18% due to Depot repair costs climbing 
100% or more.  The P-3 experienced reliability improvements for the APU, but 
the increased Depot costs and flight hours offset the benefits of the 
improvements. 
• S-3 average yearly costs grew 19% due to the higher contract costs during 
OEF and OIF, and significant growth in BCMs (97% BCM Rate during FY04) 
and associated AVDLR and Depot Repair Costs.   
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5. APU Performance 
a. Availability 
Parts availability has increased with Average Delivery Time reduced from 
35 days to 5.4 days, 98% requisitions filled and supply material availability from 65% to 
95% (Sara & Garvey, 2004). 
b. Reliability 
Improved reliability is difficult to ascertain with any certainty, because 
MFHBUR is not a good metric for determining APU reliability.  The analysis conducted 
suggests the following results: 
 The P-3 reliability has improved. 
 The FA-18, C-2, and S-3 reliability has generally remained the same or not 
improved.   
6. Logistics Footprint 
With no reliability improvements; unrealized savings in manpower, equipment, 
facilities and training; and only partial reductions in publications and transportation assets 
the logistics footprint has only been marginally reduced.  Only one aircraft type has 
demonstrated reliability improvements, while the MFHBUR for the other aircraft types 
have not improved.  This indicates that the same or more removals are still being 
conducted; therefore, no change in footprint.  For manpower, the result is a reduction in 
workload at the I-level, but not actual personnel.  Additionally, there is an actual increase 
in duties and responsibilities at the PM level.  The list of tools required for APU repair 
actions is reduced an average of 24%, but sometimes the gear is not transferred out of the 
unit or used for other maintenance actions resulting in limited savings.  There can be a 
savings in facilities, but these freed up assets (work centers, test cells, etc.) would be 
quickly absorbed into other maintenance operations negating any savings.  For training, 
there is no apparent reduction in training requirements, which means the same level of 
training is still being conducted.  Also, the contractor’s FSE add to the list of contractor 
representatives already crowding the hangar decks and maintenance facilities.  For 
publications, the Program Offices are still responsible for the technical publications for 
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other aircraft systems and the O-level portion of the APU system; therefore, only 
marginal savings in logistics footprint have been achieved in this area.  Government 
transportation is still required for shipping NRFI assets to the contractor’s facility; 
thereby, providing only a minimal reduction in footprint.  Overall, there is very little 
reduction in the logistics footprint. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Honeywell TLS APU Contract  
Contract for TLS of the APU as an end item.  The contractor would be solely 
responsible for the operational availability and reliability of the APU.  The contract 
would be a ten-year, fixed price, award term contract using the alternative pricing method 
discussed.  Contract pricing would be based solely on price by Mean APU Hours 
between Unscheduled Removals (MHBUR).  Contract metrics would include Operational 
Availability, MHBUR (APU), Logistics Response Time and cost.  The contractor would 
be responsible for providing APUs and other components to the flight line.  Measures to 
control APU removals would have to be negotiated and established to avoid unwarranted 
removals, reduced MHBUR, and contractor-incurred penalties.  Organic O-level 
personnel, in consultation with contractor FSEs and other negotiated procedures, would 
remove and replace the APU and other external APU components.  There would be no 
organic I-level APU repair capability.  The contractor would be empowered to improve 
system readiness and logistics support across the integrated logistics support elements for 
the APU. 
Specific recommendations include: 
 Use alternative pricing method, including Price by APU Operational Hours, 
that facilitates the true definition of PBL for achieving reliability 
improvements. 
 Install hour meters, start counters and or data memory buttons to accurately 
record APU usage. 
 After installing APU hour meters and start counters, change PBFR to Price by 
APU MHBUR, to provide an incentive to increase APU reliability. 
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 Rename availability to parts availability or fill rate and maintain the logistics 
response time metric as currently defined in the SOW (2000). 
 Change availability adjustment to price per component not delivered on time 
or preferably employ incentives for reducing logistics response time. 
 Change reliability metric, MFHBUR, to Mean APU Hours Between 
Unscheduled Removals (MHBUR). 
 Eliminate the gain share clause and use the alternative pricing method, which 
provides incentives, empowerment and profits to the contractor and improved 
weapon system performance and cost savings to the government.  
 Conduct a comprehensive cost benefit study to identify actual cost 
savings/avoidances and benefits obtained versus the original business case 
analysis, as discussed in GAO (2005), related to the APU TLS PBL contract.  
 Update TECOM (2002) and NAVPERS (2004) and associated training 
requirements and then reduce or eliminate training at the MOS/NEC granting 
school. 
2. Other PBL Applications 
Use long duration award term contracts with at least a five-year base and five, 
one-year additional periods for PBL applications.  The longer time duration reduces the 
contractor’s uncertainty and risk, and provides enough time for the contractor to make 
investments in improving performance, reducing costs and recouping his initial outflows. 
Conduct analysis to determine appropriate alternative pricing method to achieve 
reliability improvements rather than specified guarantees or negative incentives.  
Reliability guarantees and disincentives are not required with the alternative pricing 
method, because the contractor will accelerate reliability and other process improvements 
to make a profit as soon as possible. 
Conduct analysis to determine proper timing and other terms for establishing gain 
share measures that reflect the true definition of PBL and the contractor’s profit motive. 
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In compressing the supply chain, employ initiatives that completely transfer, 
rather than replicate, processes from organic support to commercial practices, with no 
residual organic processes remaining.  Approaches that minimally compress the supply 
chain result in fragmented efforts, duplicated processes, and a more complex supply 
chain with numerous logistics support providers.  Partnerships and contract arrangements 
should consolidate effort, and avoid parallel processes and duplicate inventories. 
To identify non-value added steps that were eliminated, specifically document 
direct links to savings (as a result of PBL partnership) and quantify improvements.  In 
conjunction with the aforementioned cost benefit analysis, continue to monitor processes 
and document realized savings and efficiencies to build a more comprehensive body of 
knowledge (data) for analysis. 
For reducing the logistics footprint, implement a more comprehensive approach to 
execution.  All ILS elements should be reviewed to identify impacts and required changes 
or adjustments.  A plan of action should address the required changes for complete 
implementation to fully realize reductions in logistics footprint. 
C.  CLOSING 
In closing, our findings indicate that non-value added steps were eliminated, and 
there were potential reductions in the logistics footprint, but the supply chain was not 
compressed and aircraft maintenance costs did not decrease.  More importantly, the APU 
reliability for the FA-18, S-3, and C-2 did not improve.  For the P-3, reliability improved 
by 7% to 19%, but not 300% per the contract guarantee.  Our research also determined 
that the reliability metric was inappropriate for measuring and tracking APU reliability 
improvements.  Additionally, disincentives were provided for not meeting contract 
requirements with the only contract incentive being the award term contract arrangement.  
Our report provided recommendations specific to the APU TLS contract and other 
recommendations for other PBL applications.  These recommendations include an 
alternative contract pricing and gain sharing methods and appropriate metrics and 












































LIST OF REFERENCES 
Berkowitz, D., Gupta, J., Simpson, J. & McWilliams, J. (2005). Defining and  
Implementing Performance-Based Logistics in Government. Defense Acquisition  
Review Journal, 37 254 - 267. 
Blanchard, B. (1998). Logistics Engineering and Management (5th ed.). Upper Saddle  
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Bureau of Naval Personnel [NAVPERS].  (2004, January).  Navy Enlisted Occupational  
Standards, Volume I (NAVPERS 18068F).  Retrieved August 25, 2005 from  
http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil. 
Candreva, P., Hill B., Marcinek, B., Sturken,  B. & Vince, B.  (2001). Auxiliary Power  
Units Total Logistics Support Case Study. Retrieved June 06, 2005 from  
http://www.nscs.cnet.navy.mil/amp/briefs/ppt/2Team3paper.pdf. 
Cruz, D. (1997) Repair Cycle Time Reduction at Naval Aviation Depots via Reduced  
Logistics Delay Time. (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). 
Department of Defense [DoD]. (2000).  Contracts:[2], 8  June.  M2 Presswire, Pg.1. 
Department of Defense [DoD].  (2001).  Product Support.  A Program Manager’s Guide  
to Buying Performance.  Unpublished Manuscript. 
Department of Defense [DoD].  (2003a).  The Defense Acquisition System (Directive  
Number 5000.1).  Retrieved April 18, 2005 from http://akss.dau.mil. 
Department of Defense [DoD].  (2003b).  Operation of The Defense Acquisition System  
(Instruction Number 5000.2).  Retrieved April 18, 2005 from http://akss.dau.mil. 
Department of Defense [DoD].  (2004).   Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG).  
Retrieved April 18, 2005 from http://akss.dau.mil. 
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General [IG]. (2000). Commercial  
Contract for Total Logistics Support of Aircraft Auxiliary Power Units  
(D-2000-180).  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Devries, H. J. (2005). Performance-Based Logistics - Barriers and Enablers to Effective  
Implementation. Defense Acquisition Review Journal, 37 243- 253. 
 64
Doerr, K., Eaton, D.R., & Lewis I.A, (2004) Measurement Issues in Performance Based  
Logistics. (Technical Report, Naval Postgraduate School)_(NPS-GSBPP-04-003). 
DoDIG, (2001, June 11).  DODIG APU TLS BRIEF.  Presented to Mr. Robert Lieberman. 
Garrett, G. (2001).  World Class Contracting: How Winning Companies Build Successful  
Partnerships in the e-Business Age.  Chicago, Illinois: CCH Incorporated. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO].  (2004).  Opportunities to Enhance the  
Implementation of Performance-Based Logistics (GAO-04-715).  Washington,  
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO].  (2005).   DoD Needs to Demonstrate that  
Performance Based Logistics Contracts are Achieving Expected Benefits (GAO- 
05-966).  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Hearn, E. (2002).  Federal Acquisition and Contract Management, 5th Edition.  Los  
Altos, California: Hearn Associates 
Honeywell. (2005, June 22).  Navy Total Logistics Support Program Management  
Review Number 1.  Presented to NAVICP. 
House Armed Services Committee [HASC].  (2001, March 23).  Statement of Colonel  
Gilda A. Jackson, United States Marine Corps Commanding Officer, Naval  
Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina before the Subcommittee on  
Military Readiness  of the House Armed Services Committee on the Future  
Viability of Depot-level Maintenance and Repair.  Retrieved August 23, 2005 
from http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases. 
Joint Depot Maintenance Activities Group [JDMAG].  (2005).  Joint Service Best  
Business Practices.  Retrieved August 23, 2005 from  
http://www.jdmag.wpafb.af.mil/bestbusnavair.htm. 
Kotlanger, J. & Giuntini, R. (2005, June 09).  Performance Based Logistics.  Presented at  
a seminar in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Lucyshyn, W., Rendon, R., & Novello, S. (2005).  Improving Readiness with a Public- 
Private Partnership: NAVAIR’s Auxiliary Power Unit Total Logistics Support  
Program.  (Case Study, University of Maryland). 
 65
Training and Evaluation Command [TECOM]. (2002, August 13).  Individual Training  
Standards System (ITSS) (Maintenance Training Management and Evaluation  
Program) (Short title: ITSS (MATMEP)) (MCO P4790.20).  Retrieved August 25,  
2005 from http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/. 
Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR].  (2004a, September 2004).  Gas Turbine  
Engine Three Degrees of Intermediate Maintenance Activity Assignments  
(NAVAIRNOTE 4700).  Retrieved August 25, 2005 from 
https://directives.navair.navy.mil//index.cfm 
Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR].  (2004b, December 01).  Policy Guidance for  
Performance Based Logistics Candidates (NAVAIRINST 4081.2A).  Retrieved  
June 07, 2005 from https://directives.navair.navy.mil//index.cfm 
Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP].  (2004, September 13).  Naval Supply  
Procedures, Revision 3 with Change 4.  (NAVSUP Publication 485). 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP].  (2005).  Seven Steps to Performance- 
Based Services Acquisition.  Retrieved May 31, 2005 from  
http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/pbsc/home.html 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP] & Office of Management and Budget  
[OMB].  (1998).  A Guide To Best Practices For Performance-Based Service  
Contracting.  Retrieved May 31, 2005 from  
www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/PPBSC/BestPPBSC.html. 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP] & Office of Management and Budget  
[OMB].  (2005).  Types of Contracts (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Subpart 16.4).  Retrieved May 31, 2005 from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/reghtml/regs/far2afmcfars/fardfars/far/16.htm. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD].  (2001).  Quadrennial Defense Review  
Report.  Retrieved April 18, 2005 from www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics [OSD-ATL].  (2001).  Incentive Strategies for Defense Acquisitions.  
Retrieved May 31, 2005, from http://www.acq.osd.mil/. 
 66
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics [OSD-ATL].  (2002).  Performance-Based Logistics. Retrieved June 15,  
2005 from https://acc.dau.mil/. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics [OSD-ATL].  (2003). Designing and Assessing Supportability in DoD  
Weapon Systems: A Guide to Increased Reliability and Reduced Logistics  
Footprint. Retrieved June 15, 2005 from https://acc.dau.mil/. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics [OSD-ATL].  (2004a).  Performance Based Logistics: Business Case  
Analysis. Retrieved April 18, 2005 from http://www.acq.osd.mil/. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics [OSD-ATL].  (2004b).  Performance Based Logistics: Purchasing  
Using Performance Based Criteria.  Retrieved Jun 06, 2005 from  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/. 
Sarra, F., Garvey, L.  (2004).  Today's Supply Chain, Buying Performance Not  
Parts.  Newsletter - United States.  Navy Supply Corps, 67(3), 3-6.  
Stevens, B. & Yoder, C. (2005, September) Award-Term Contracts: Good For  
Business.  Contract Management, 30-35. 




















































































































S-3 AVDLR AFM DMMH Depot Estimated 
Contract Cost 
Total Costs 
FY99 $3,167,590.00 $112,533.00 $65,933.00 $452,852.00 $0.00 $3,798,908.00
FY00 $4,147,475.35 $1,219.92 $57,064.10 $408,513.62 $0.00 $4,614,272.99
FY01 $2,783,900.03 $109,907.97 $46,204.59 $453,841.27 $2,542,582.17 $3,393,853.86
FY02 $2,467,708.13 $10,509.62 $562,872.93 $631,870.85 $4,730,600.59 $5,935,853.99
FY03 $3,728,623.28 $2,657.51 $210,057.36 $677,278.56 $4,172,272.21 $5,062,265.63






P-3 AVDLR AFM DMMH Depot Estimated 
Contract Cost 
Total Costs 
FY99 $3,515,080.00 $128,912.00 $549,266.00 $381,112.00 $0.00 $4,574,370.00
FY00 $4,770,074.95 $261,061.14 $649,188.36 $295,254.86 $0.00 $5,983,846.45
FY01 $4,504,802.87 $190,744.94 $491,229.29 $577,728.00 $2,634,972.94 $5,796,800.10
FY02 $5,480,534.39 $38,640.69 $536,784.15 $739,823.14 $4,986,658.38 $6,859,111.23
FY03 $3,454,528.87 $47,135.60 $591,750.05 $934,361.17 $4,614,405.37 $6,288,096.02
FY04 $5,084,965.33 $40,610.26 $489,138.23 $531,178.86 $3,237,571.20 $6,216,698.82
C-2 AVDLR AFM DMMH Depot Estimated 
Contract Cost 
Total Costs 
FY99 $590,170.00 $14,313.00 $98,545.00 $90,943.00 $0.00 $793,971.00
FY00 $611,893.49 $685.40 $43,493.10 $80,340.47 $0.00 $736,412.46
FY01 $721,007.46 $6,564.95 $42,126.32 $208,580.36 $383,721.56 $978,279.09
FY02 $613,228.23 $2,048.96 $43,302.53 $76,077.75 $697,236.80 $818,666.03
FY03 $829,085.95 $1,558.21 $36,230.96 $99,431.15 $581,902.91 $966,306.27
FY04 $655,475.73 $2,271.84 $11,321.31 $121,459.45 $567,570.30 $790,528.33
FA-18 AVDLR AFM DMMH Depot Estimated 
Contract Cost 
Total Costs 
FY99 $9,255,840.00 $438,707.00 $1,000,012.00 $1,511,037.00 $0.00 $12,205,596.00
FY00 $6,548,323.47 $386,367.85 $744,844.18 $1,082,676.07 $0.00 $8,762,211.57
FY01 $3,327,317.64 $379,670.64 $703,452.48 $933,997.54 $3,059,604.59 $5,344,438.30
FY02 $3,035,806.82 $463,793.10 $832,833.87 $1,038,125.46 $5,736,666.36 $8,071,418.79
FY03 $5,266,470.75 $655,006.58 $889,518.53 $1,097,582.84 $5,671,907.03 $8,314,014.99


















































TOT REMS CANNS MFHBUR MFLTSBUR 
1998/10 2,185 9,864 27 0 365.3 80.9 
1998/11 1,908 8,047 27 0 298.0 70.7 
1998/12 1,798 8,295 19 0 436.6 94.6 
1999/01 1,862 8,229 30 0 274.3 62.1 
1999/02 2,006 9,327 23 0 405.5 87.2 
1999/03 2,372 11,039 26 0 424.6 91.2 
1999/04 2,170 10,345 31 0 333.7 70.0 
1999/05 2,043 9,415 25 0 376.6 81.7 
1999/06 2,125 10,340 30 1 344.7 70.8 
1999/07 1,810 7,921 34 0 233.0 53.2 
1999/08 1,970 8,796 29 0 303.3 67.9 
1999/09 2,004 8,899 23 0 386.9 87.1 
1999/10 2,021 9,026 27 0 334.3 74.9 
1999/11 1,781 7,760 27 0 287.4 66.0 
1999/12 1,724 6,944 11 0 631.3 156.7 
2000/01 1,766 7,221 20 0 361.1 88.3 
2000/02 1,906 8,182 28 0 292.2 68.1 
2000/03 2,204 9,605 27 0 355.7 81.6 
2000/04 2,020 8,766 31 0 282.8 65.2 
2000/05 2,084 9,248 44 0 210.2 47.4 
2000/06 2,151 9,923 42 0 236.3 51.2 
2000/07 1,889 8,238 24 0 343.3 78.7 
2000/08 1,910 8,221 39 0 210.8 49.0 
2000/09 1,823 8,240 42 1 196.2 43.4 
2000/10 2,050 9,293 46 1 202.0 44.6 
2000/11 1,879 8,328 34 0 244.9 55.3 
2000/12 1,509 7,139 14 1 509.9 107.8 
2001/01 1,880 8,261 29 1 284.9 64.8 
2001/02 1,889 8,560 29 0 295.2 65.1 
2001/03 2,060 9,114 29 0 314.3 71.0 
2001/04 2,200 9,332 28 0 333.3 78.6 
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2001/05 2,068 9,311 38 0 245.0 54.4 
2001/06 1,783 8,281 19 1 435.8 93.8 
2001/07 1,864 8,450 26 0 325.0 71.7 
2001/08 2,064 9,321 43 1 216.8 48.0 
2001/09 1,887 9,124 44 1 207.4 42.9 
2001/10 2,048 9,766 48 0 203.5 42.7 
2001/11 2,012 9,567 25 1 382.7 80.5 
2001/12 1,952 9,444 37 0 255.2 52.8 
2002/01 2,089 10,469 38 0 275.5 55.0 
2002/02 1,997 9,902 40 1 247.6 49.9 
2002/03 2,148 10,649 28 1 380.3 76.7 
2002/04 2,241 10,361 33 0 314.0 67.9 
2002/05 2,262 10,896 42 0 259.4 53.9 
2002/06 1,850 8,752 34 0 257.4 54.4 
2002/07 2,061 9,964 50 0 199.3 41.2 
2002/08 2,063 10,056 24 0 419.0 86.0 
2002/09 2,035 9,467 44 1 215.2 46.3 
2002/10 2,138 10,111 31 0 326.2 69.0 
2002/11 1,865 8,881 11 1 807.4 169.5 
2002/12 1,598 7,597 15 1 506.5 106.5 
2003/01 1,903 8,495 17 0 499.7 111.9 
2003/02 1,999 9,322 11 3 847.5 181.7 
2003/03 1,913 9,213 14 0 658.1 136.6 
2003/04 2,230 11,197 22 0 509.0 101.4 
2003/05 2,092 9,388 16 0 586.8 130.8 
2003/06 1,901 8,719 16 0 544.9 118.8 
2003/07 1,995 8,889 17 1 522.9 117.4 
2003/08 1,813 8,594 14 0 613.9 129.5 
2003/09 1,961 9,049 14 0 646.4 140.1 
2003/10 1,891 8,157 16 0 509.8 118.2 
2003/11 1,536 6,711 28 0 239.7 54.9 
2003/12 1,375 6,014 14 0 429.6 98.2 
2004/01 1,407 5,672 13 0 436.3 108.2 
2004/02 1,462 6,151 6 0 1025.2 243.7 
2004/03 1,549 6,408 12 0 534.0 129.1 
2004/04 1,551 6,334 29 0 218.4 53.5 
2004/05 1,412 5,982 10 0 598.2 141.2 
2004/06 1,475 6,212 16 0 388.3 92.2 
2004/07 1,529 6,253 9 0 694.8 169.9 
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2004/08 1,534 6,377 15 0 425.1 102.3 







TOT REMS CANNS MFHBUR MFLTSBUR 
1998/10 533 1,020 1 0 1020.0 533.0 
1998/11 552 1,041 2 0 520.5 276.0 
1998/12 287 546 3 0 182.0 95.7 
1999/01 283 624 3 0 208.0 94.3 
1999/02 384 754 2 0 377.0 192.0 
1999/03 524 910 2 2 455.0 262.0 
1999/04 522 965 1 0 965.0 522.0 
1999/05 520 905 0 0 905.0 905.0 
1999/06 644 1,140 1 0 1140.0 644.0 
1999/07 571 1,023 0 0 1023.0 1023.0 
1999/08 337 722 2 0 361.0 168.5 
1999/09 373 783 5 0 156.6 74.6 
1999/10 452 912 2 0 456.0 226.0 
1999/11 352 666 2 0 333.0 176.0 
1999/12 326 623 2 0 311.5 163.0 
2000/01 292 581 0 0 581.0 581.0 
2000/02 402 761 1 0 761.0 402.0 
2000/03 572 971 1 0 971.0 572.0 
2000/04 414 689 2 0 344.5 207.0 
2000/05 567 1,007 4 0 251.8 141.8 
2000/06 476 898 3 0 299.3 158.7 
2000/07 231 475 1 1 475.0 231.0 
2000/08 299 649 0 0 649.0 649.0 
2000/09 442 739 0 0 739.0 739.0 
2000/10 647 1,157 2 0 578.5 323.5 
2000/11 470 827 0 0 827.0 827.0 
2000/12 359 702 2 0 351.0 179.5 
2001/01 360 734 2 0 367.0 180.0 
2001/02 507 856 0 0 856.0 856.0 
2001/03 460 834 1 0 834.0 460.0 
2001/04 426 926 1 0 926.0 426.0 
2001/05 430 839 1 0 839.0 430.0 
2001/06 527 951 0 0 951.0 951.0 
2001/07 441 817 1 0 817.0 441.0 
2001/08 411 799 2 0 399.5 205.5 
2001/09 454 894 5 0 178.8 90.8 
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2001/10 445 1,012 1 0 1012.0 445.0 
2001/11 458 1,001 2 0 500.5 229.0 
2001/12 318 722 1 0 722.0 318.0 
2002/01 378 952 2 0 476.0 189.0 
2002/02 450 1,028 2 0 514.0 225.0 
2002/03 433 869 1 0 869.0 433.0 
2002/04 472 1,041 0 0 1041.0 1041.0 
2002/05 502 1,014 3 0 338.0 167.3 
2002/06 382 764 1 0 764.0 382.0 
2002/07 449 868 1 0 868.0 449.0 
2002/08 447 914 2 0 457.0 223.5 
2002/09 397 844 0 0 844.0 844.0 
2002/10 361 676 0 0 676.0 676.0 
2002/11 441 744 3 0 248.0 147.0 
2002/12 382 719 4 0 179.8 95.5 
2003/01 545 887 2 0 443.5 272.5 
2003/02 521 880 0 0 880.0 880.0 
2003/03 507 733 4 0 183.3 126.8 
2003/04 443 722 0 0 722.0 722.0 
2003/05 342 596 4 0 149.0 85.5 
2003/06 440 871 0 0 871.0 871.0 
2003/07 335 744 0 0 744.0 744.0 
2003/08 375 827 2 1 413.5 187.5 
2003/09 350 728 0 0 728.0 728.0 
2003/10 362 744 2 0 372.0 181.0 
2003/11 330 646 1 0 646.0 330.0 
2003/12 288 589 1 0 589.0 288.0 
2004/01 305 586 3 0 195.3 101.7 
2004/02 404 758 0 0 758.0 758.0 
2004/03 456 869 1 0 869.0 456.0 
2004/04 426 830 1 0 830.0 426.0 
2004/05 360 663 1 0 663.0 360.0 
2004/06 485 846 1 0 846.0 485.0 
2004/07 528 858 1 0 858.0 528.0 
2004/08 374 721 0 0 721.0 721.0 








TOT REMS CANNS MFHBUR MFLTSBUR 
1998/10 1,819 3,862 8 0 482.8 227.4 
1998/11 1,867 4,015 10 0 401.5 186.7 
1998/12 1,324 3,044 22 0 138.4 60.2 
1999/01 1,407 3,000 19 1 157.9 74.1 
1999/02 1,851 4,177 7 2 596.7 264.4 
1999/03 2,320 4,821 16 2 301.3 145.0 
1999/04 1,645 3,374 14 0 241.0 117.5 
1999/05 1,802 3,976 13 0 305.8 138.6 
1999/06 1,940 4,228 13 0 325.2 149.2 
1999/07 2,042 4,408 13 0 339.1 157.1 
1999/08 2,011 4,156 18 1 230.9 111.7 
1999/09 1,241 2,589 18 1 143.8 68.9 
1999/10 1,947 4,170 18 2 231.7 108.2 
1999/11 1,816 3,652 15 0 243.5 121.1 
1999/12 1,250 2,754 12 1 229.5 104.2 
2000/01 1,551 3,065 13 0 235.8 119.3 
2000/02 1,510 3,023 13 0 232.5 116.2 
2000/03 1,972 4,316 12 1 359.7 164.3 
2000/04 1,559 3,229 12 0 269.1 129.9 
2000/05 1,930 4,246 15 0 283.1 128.7 
2000/06 1,505 3,317 12 0 276.4 125.4 
2000/07 1,314 2,561 22 0 116.4 59.7 
2000/08 1,633 3,256 9 1 361.8 181.4 
2000/09 1,637 3,217 23 0 139.9 71.2 
2000/10 2,220 4,481 15 1 298.7 148.0 
2000/11 1,646 3,209 12 1 267.4 137.2 
2000/12 1,095 2,220 11 1 201.8 99.5 
2001/01 1,458 2,729 17 0 160.5 85.8 
2001/02 1,590 2,783 14 0 198.8 113.6 
2001/03 1,907 3,825 12 0 318.8 158.9 
2001/04 1,803 3,328 11 0 302.5 163.9 
2001/05 1,966 3,633 13 0 279.5 151.2 
2001/06 1,738 3,423 5 0 684.6 347.6 
2001/07 1,665 2,940 14 0 210.0 118.9 
2001/08 1,744 3,574 19 0 188.1 91.8 
2001/09 1,738 3,190 8 0 398.8 217.3 
2001/10 2,396 4,938 7 0 705.4 342.3 
2001/11 2,164 4,409 14 0 314.9 154.6 
2001/12 1,660 3,334 11 0 303.1 150.9 
2002/01 2,095 3,921 11 0 356.5 190.5 
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2002/02 1,655 3,323 7 0 474.7 236.4 
2002/03 1,993 3,869 11 0 351.7 181.2 
2002/04 2,041 4,443 21 0 211.6 97.2 
2002/05 1,658 3,551 6 0 591.8 276.3 
2002/06 1,518 3,087 7 0 441.0 216.9 
2002/07 1,754 3,529 10 0 352.9 175.4 
2002/08 1,440 2,741 7 0 391.6 205.7 
2002/09 1,714 3,415 5 0 683.0 342.8 
2002/10 1,948 3,493 12 0 291.1 162.3 
2002/11 1,796 3,534 16 0 220.9 112.3 
2002/12 1,115 2,020 4 0 505.0 278.8 
2003/01 2,056 3,916 10 0 391.6 205.6 
2003/02 1,705 3,306 4 0 826.5 426.3 
2003/03 2,869 5,533 2 0 2766.5 1434.5 
2003/04 2,274 4,655 8 0 581.9 284.3 
2003/05 1,102 2,166 5 0 433.2 220.4 
2003/06 1,261 2,400 10 0 240.0 126.1 
2003/07 1,346 2,703 10 0 270.3 134.6 
2003/08 1,374 2,441 6 0 406.8 229.0 
2003/09 1,422 2,804 8 0 350.5 177.8 
2003/10 1,280 2,345 12 0 195.4 106.7 
2003/11 1,437 2,947 8 0 368.4 179.6 
2003/12 1,032 2,040 4 0 510.0 258.0 
2004/01 1,502 2,598 5 0 519.6 300.4 
2004/02 1,219 2,104 6 0 350.7 203.2 
2004/03 1,504 3,090 5 0 618.0 300.8 
2004/04 1,374 2,854 7 0 407.7 196.3 
2004/05 1,278 2,391 5 0 478.2 255.6 
2004/06 1,870 3,263 6 0 543.8 311.7 
2004/07 1,085 2,437 4 0 609.3 271.3 
2004/08 1,295 2,561 4 0 640.3 323.8 








TOT REMS CANNS MFHBUR MFLTSBUR 
1998/10 15,239 20,869 14 1 1490.6 1088.5 
1998/11 12,372 17,147 27 0 635.1 458.2 
1998/12 10,110 14,272 18 0 792.9 561.7 
1999/01 12,933 18,526 29 0 638.8 446.0 
1999/02 15,072 21,332 27 2 790.1 558.2 
1999/03 16,006 22,898 21 0 1090.4 762.2 
1999/04 12,816 17,839 23 0 775.6 557.2 
1999/05 14,351 20,452 30 1 681.7 478.4 
1999/06 13,731 19,767 28 0 706.0 490.4 
1999/07 13,177 19,448 23 1 845.6 572.9 
1999/08 12,439 17,651 33 2 534.9 376.9 
1999/09 12,199 17,562 22 1 798.3 554.5 
1999/10 12,716 17,497 13 1 1345.9 978.2 
1999/11 12,207 17,516 28 1 625.6 436.0 
1999/12 10,235 14,346 17 0 843.9 602.1 
2000/01 12,119 17,147 30 0 571.6 404.0 
2000/02 13,317 18,802 35 1 537.2 380.5 
2000/03 14,134 20,217 18 0 1123.2 785.2 
2000/04 13,607 18,720 28 0 668.6 486.0 
2000/05 15,299 21,031 12 1 1752.6 1274.9 
2000/06 13,314 18,884 29 1 651.2 459.1 
2000/07 12,405 17,109 24 0 712.9 516.9 
2000/08 14,887 20,725 35 0 592.1 425.3 
2000/09 13,350 18,861 30 0 628.7 445.0 
2000/10 14,554 20,440 27 0 757.0 539.0 
2000/11 12,228 16,905 37 1 456.9 330.5 
2000/12 10,171 14,492 14 1 1035.1 726.5 
2001/01 12,697 17,856 37 1 482.6 343.2 
2001/02 13,283 18,692 30 0 623.1 442.8 
2001/03 14,678 20,899 26 0 803.8 564.5 
2001/04 13,492 18,811 41 1 458.8 329.1 
2001/05 15,118 20,510 32 0 640.9 472.4 
2001/06 13,895 20,428 20 0 1021.4 694.8 
2001/07 14,089 19,559 25 0 782.4 563.6 
2001/08 15,358 21,609 27 1 800.3 568.8 
2001/09 12,762 17,857 31 1 576.0 411.7 
2001/10 14,223 23,211 32 2 725.3 444.5 
2001/11 12,324 22,327 36 1 620.2 342.3 
2001/12 11,402 20,325 24 1 846.9 475.1 
2002/01 14,420 23,089 35 0 659.7 412.0 
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2002/02 13,118 20,017 20 0 1000.9 655.9 
2002/03 13,667 20,600 47 1 438.3 290.8 
2002/04 15,386 23,285 22 0 1058.4 699.4 
2002/05 14,912 22,170 31 1 715.2 481.0 
2002/06 13,473 19,823 33 2 600.7 408.3 
2002/07 15,032 22,899 33 3 693.9 455.5 
2002/08 15,470 23,090 42 0 549.8 368.3 
2002/09 14,411 21,384 24 1 891.0 600.5 
2002/10 15,689 21,345 33 0 646.8 475.4 
2002/11 13,610 19,879 41 1 484.9 332.0 
2002/12 11,002 15,034 32 1 469.8 343.8 
2003/01 15,059 21,634 34 0 636.3 442.9 
2003/02 13,435 20,341 25 0 813.6 537.4 
2003/03 17,219 28,719 30 0 957.3 574.0 
2003/04 16,261 31,637 23 0 1375.5 707.0 
2003/05 11,326 17,573 28 0 627.6 404.5 
2003/06 14,346 20,751 47 0 441.5 305.2 
2003/07 13,671 20,017 35 2 571.9 390.6 
2003/08 14,152 19,201 22 0 872.8 643.3 
2003/09 14,873 20,997 31 0 677.3 479.8 
2003/10 13,890 18,289 25 0 731.6 555.6 
2003/11 12,261 17,750 20 0 887.5 613.1 
2003/12 12,286 17,015 28 0 607.7 438.8 
2004/01 13,371 18,686 21 0 889.8 636.7 
2004/02 14,503 20,191 36 1 560.9 402.9 
2004/03 17,165 24,676 30 0 822.5 572.2 
2004/04 15,215 21,337 24 0 889.0 634.0 
2004/05 13,886 19,267 16 2 1204.2 867.9 
2004/06 15,494 22,727 23 0 988.1 673.7 
2004/07 12,665 19,277 27 0 714.0 469.1 
2004/08 15,464 22,441 20 1 1122.1 773.2 
2004/09 14,301 22,101 17 1 1300.1 841.2 
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